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Abstract:
Evolving communication technologies stimulate a rapid growth in utilisation of
communication-capable devices and therefore amount of transmitted data. This im-
poses new requirements for automatic device and data management necessary for suc-
cessful exploitation of new opportunities. Unfortunately, currently developed systems,
including Internet of Things and Machine-to-Machine communications, mainly focus
on industrial applications that involve fixed users, proprietary environments as well as
ad-hoc devices and things, whereas regular users along with possibilities and challenges
created by growing sets of personal user equipment remain ignored.
This thesis addresses the defined problem by analysing currently developed and utilised
communication technologies and identity management systems as well as proposing an
advanced identity management system that considers user-related needs and enables
user-aware automatic device-to-device communications. Our system is unique com-
pared to other automatic communication systems in that it enables global communica-
tion of devices owned or used by different parties and supports dynamic connection and
relationship establishment based on data administered in a sophisticated identity man-
agement infrastructure. Unlike existing identity management mechanisms, our system
extends the notion of an identified and authenticated entity to a combination of both
user and device. Furthermore, the system introduces an original Single Device Sign-
On feature that simplifies user login procedure when accessing a service with multiple
devices. As a consequence, this thesis suggests a new direction for evolution of commu-
nication technologies as well as user-targeted Internet-based services and applications.
Keywords: identity management, device communication, user-oriented communica-
tion, multiple device authentication, single device sign-on, cloud
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project.
3GPP2 3rd Generation Partnership Project 2.
AAA Authentication, Authorisation and Account-
ing.
ABAC Attribute-Based Access Control.
AC Assertion Consumer.
ACL Access Control List.
ACM Access Control Matrix.
AcN Access Network.
AmI Ambient Intelligence.
ANP Access Network Provider.
API Application Programming Interface.
App-ID Application Identifier.
ARPANET Advanced Research Projects Agency Network.
AS Authorisation Server.
BT Bluetooth.
CN M2M Core Network.
CONN-ID Service Connection Identifier.
D’D D’ Device.
DA Device Application.
DD D Device.
dD d Device.
DIP Device Interworking Proxy.
DNS Domain Name System.
DS Device Subsystem.
DSCL Device Service Capabilities Layer.
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EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol.
EPC Electronic Product Code.
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards In-
stitute.
FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name.
FTP File Transfer Protocol.
GA Gateway Application.
GIP Gateway Interworking Proxy.
GSCL Gateway Service Capabilities Layer.
HTML Hypertext Markup Language.
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol.
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure.
IBAKE Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange.
IBC Identity-Based Cryptography.
ICT Information and Communication Technology.
ID-FF Identity Federation Framework.
IdM Identity Management.
IdP Identity Provider.
IdPS Identity Provider Subsystem.
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity.
IoT Internet of Things.
IP Internet Protocol.
IR Infra-Red.
JSON JavaScript Object Notation.
Kma M2M Application Key.
Kmc M2M Connection Key.
Kmr M2M Root Key.
M-Bus Meter-Bus.
M2M Machine-to-Machine.
MAC Media Access Control.
MAS M2M Authentication Server.
MAS-ID MAS Identifier.
MSBF M2M Service Bootstrap Function.
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MSBF-ID MSBF Identifier.
MSCF M2M Service Connection Function.
MTC Machine-Type Communications.
MTC-IWF MTC Interworking Function.
NA Network Application.
NFC Near-Field Communication.
NIC Network Interface Card.
Node-ID Node Identifier.
NSCL Network Service Capabilities Layer.
OID Object Identifier.
OIdP OpenID Identity Provider.
ONS Object Naming Service.
OS Operating System.
PC personal computer.
PIN Personal Identification Number.
PLC Programmable Logic Controller.
PLMN Public Land Mobile Network.
PoC M2M Point of Contact.
PROV-ID Service Provider Identifier.
PSK Pre-Shared Key.
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service.
RBAC Role-Based Access Control.
RelP Relying Party.
REST Representational State Transfer.
RFID Radio Frequency Identification.
RO Resource Owner.
RP Reference Point.
RS Resource Server.
SAML Security Assertion Markup Language.
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition.
SCL Service Capabilities Layer.
SCL-ID SCL Identifier.
SCS Services Capability Server.
SDSO Single Device Sign-On.
SMS Short Message Service.
SP Service Provider.
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SS Service Subsystem.
SSO Single Sign-On.
TEE Trusted Execution Environment.
TISPAN Telecommunications and Internet Converged
Services and Protocols for Advanced Network-
ing.
TLS Transport Layer Security.
UA User Agent.
UE User Equipment.
UICC Universal Integrated Circuit Card.
UML Universal Modelling Language.
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications Sys-
tem.
UPID User-Provided Identifier.
URI Universal Resource Identifier.
URL Universal Resource Locator.
W-LAN Wireless Local Area Network.
WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Ac-
cess.
WPAN Wireless Private Area Network.
xDSL x Digital Subscriber Line.
XML Extensible Markup Language.
XRI Extensible Resource Identifier.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Less than half a century ago, in 1969, one of the first packet-switched net-
works called Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) was
established with the goal of providing universities and research laboratories
with a long-distance data exchange mechanism. Besides accomplishing this
goal, ARPANET also initiated development of various networking protocols
that have afterwards resulted in creation of the Internet utilised not only
by academia, but also businesses, governments and everyday users, thus im-
proving lives in many aspects.
Although the early version of the Internet enabled global communication,
it provided a regular user with a rather limited functionality, i.e. remote
communications via email and access to static web sites in the World Wide
Web. The key factor that made the Internet as powerful as we know it to-
day was creation of digital user identities and Identity Management (IdM)
mechanisms that enabled treating on-line and physical user presence alike.
By providing user-friendly features for identity creation and access to data,
e.g. by using federated IdM systems and Single Sign-On (SSO) functionality,
origination of IdM systems was the key factor that stimulated emergence of
web-based services, social networks and other automated user-related func-
tionality.
Currently, as the number of various network-connected devices rapidly
increases, the minds behind evolution of communication networks and In-
formation and Communication Technology (ICT) are putting effort into cre-
ation of autonomous device communications and utilisation of these devices
to gather sufficient data to enable even more capable, automatic and intel-
ligent applications. The most prominent of the new technologies addressing
these aspects are Machine-to-Machine (M2M) and Internet of Things (IoT).
M2M systems introduce the concept of autonomously functioning networked
devices with no or only minimal intervention of human personnel. This
11
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technology mainly focuses on devices themselves and capabilities required
for their autonomous functioning. A related technology, IoT addresses the
amount of data these connected devices generate and thus emphasises the
need for an infrastructure and applications, i.e. an advanced version of the
Internet, capable of handling this data.
Although the mentioned technologies seem promising, they principally
aim at industrial applications based on isolated hierarchies of proprietary
communicating devices. Furthermore, most of these devices are rather prim-
itive and serve only a single pre-defined purpose, i.e. sensors gather spe-
cific kind of data, actuators perform certain physical operations and Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID) tags embed a device concept into ordinary
things by merely enabling their identification needed for discovery of their
meta-data. As a result, M2M and IoT enable systems with pre-defined par-
ties that are involved in communication and management and linked together
using static relationships.
Our vision of evolution in communication technologies differs from the
previously mentioned approaches in the following aspects. First, the tech-
nology should serve a regular human user and involve his/her devices as well
as custom user applications. Second, it should enable dynamic, on-demand
relationships among communicating parties, e.g. user’s devices and local ser-
vice provider servers, rather than be limited to fixed and pre-configured links.
Thus, in order to enable this functionality, currently developed technologies
are insufficient and a different approach is needed.
This thesis shows that the described evolutionary step of device-to-device
communications can be achieved by applying the means proven successful be-
fore, i.e. creating a suitable IdM infrastructure. We address the problem of
user-oriented, dynamic and intelligent communications by presenting an IdM
system that involves both user and device identities, thus providing sufficient
data for automatic and dynamic user-aware interaction of devices. The pro-
posed system addresses various user-related IdM challenges, including multi-
ple identities, shared hardware equipment and continuously increasing num-
ber of devices carried by a user. By noticing the improvements in usability
created by federated IdM systems and SSO service, we further enhance the
IdM system by proposing a Single Device Sign-On (SDSO) mechanism that
enables a user to connect to a service with multiple devices he/she carries by
performing authentication procedure from one of the devices.
It is important to note that although our system was initially aimed
at M2M communications, literature analysis that was performed as part of
the thesis process revealed that current M2M concept is rather limited and
essentially addresses the mentioned static systems. Conversely, we aim at
enabling global dynamic device-to-device communications. Therefore, unless
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we specifically refer to M2M technology and specifications, we use the term
M2M to describe autonomous device-to-device communications.
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the background
of identities, identity management mechanisms and their roles, as well as
briefly discusses future communication technologies under development. Af-
terwards, Chapter 3 further covers the current situation of IdM and commu-
nication systems by presenting the most relevant systems implemented as in-
dustrial solutions or proposed in scientific literature. Subsequently, Chapter
4 explains the proposed system’s idea, the problems it tackles and targeted
use cases. Afterwards, Chapter 5 presents the actual solution. Chapter 6
evaluates the system from various perspectives and provides a discussion.
Finally, Chapter 7 provides final remarks and conclusion of the thesis.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter presents the background information related to IdM and future
communication technologies. This information is used in further chapters of
this thesis. Section 2.1 analyses the importance of identities, IdM and IdM
systems. Afterwards, Section 2.2 provides an overview of currently devel-
oped future communication technologies, specifically M2M, IoT and Ambi-
ent Intelligence (AmI). These technologies are believed to provide the basis
for ubiquitous computing and advanced automatic applications. Chapter 3
continues the description of the technologies presented in this chapter by
discussing implementations of these technologies and their standardisation
processes.
2.1 Identity Management
2.1.1 Utilisation of Identifiers
Information and communication systems largely utilise various identifiers
necessary for recognition of a communicating party, as well as consistent
session management. For example, one of the popular computer network-
ing models, the TCP/IP model, contains 4 layers responsible for distinct
functionality related to communications, as explained in Chapter 1 of [32].
Each of the layers introduces a certain identifier, e.g. a Media Access Con-
trol (MAC), Internet Protocol (IP) and email addresses for identification of
a Network Interface Card (NIC), network-host combination and a human
user, respectively. These identifiers are necessary for identification and data
transmission over a communication channel.
Although sufficient for low-level communication or user-controlled appli-
cations, identifiers often do not carry enough data to enable higher-level
14
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 15
automatic applications. Thus, additional information related to communi-
cating entities or peers is needed for connection establishment and further
communication in higher-level application context.
2.1.2 Identities
Data that describes relevant features of a subject, i.e. a person or a thing,
and stored in digital space is called digital identity, as defined by Windley
[61]. According to the author, digital identity features are comprised of
attributes, describing subject’s characteristics, preferences and traits, which
are similar to attributes but are more inherent to the subject and experience
very rare or no modifications. In this document, we simplify the definition of
a digital identity and use identity to refer to a set of attributes characterizing
a communicating entity.
It is clear that data used to describe human users and devices differ rather
significantly, in such aspects as data format, number of data sets and their
relation to each other, data sensitivity, as well as utilisation and manage-
ment of data, which may be regulated by law. Furthermore, behaviour of
users and devices differs rather significantly. For example, a user typically
controls a device, and the latter simply performs requested operations, i.e. it
is dependent on the user. Therefore, scientific literature typically uses term
identity for user entities, i.e. researchers analyse user identities and treat
device-related data merely as device meta-data [13, 53]. On the other hand,
recent scientific works, such as Hydra project [4], are starting to address the
increasing intelligence and actuality of devices, thus they treat device-related
data as device identities. To address the mentioned similarities between user
and device entities from the perspective of communication, we address both
user- and device-related data sets as identities. However, due to inherent dif-
ferences, we make a distinction between device identities and user identities,
and further analyse these identities separately.
Identities enable entity identification, i.e. recognition of a party by
detecting its unique characteristics. This process enables personalisa-
tion/customisation of a service and communication, as well as access to and
manipulation of personal or other entity-related data. In this respect, at-
tributes are used to represent identifiers, which are partitioned into strong
and weak identifiers [8]. A strong identifier is sufficient to uniquely identify
the entity in the system, and its value often does not have other purposes.
On the other hand, a weak identifier provides important information about
an entity, but its value may be shared with multiple other entities in the same
system. Thus, the strength of an attribute is determined by the uniqueness
of its value and the overall number of entities in the system. Furthermore,
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a set of weak identifiers may enable reliable identification of a unique entity.
Besides attributes, other information units, such as certificates, can be used
to perform identification.
All identity data is created, managed and protected by a certain man-
agement authority, generally called an IdM system. The remainder of this
section thoroughly analyses IdM system actions and models.
2.1.3 Entity Authentication
Merely providing identity information, e.g. an identifier, without a proof
that this information really belongs to the claimed entity, is often insuf-
ficient. Thus, multiple systems require communicating parties to perform
entity authentication, which is one of the primary functions of IdM systems
[61]. Authentication is a procedure performed to verify that an entity is what
it claims to be. This operation is critical in many systems that involve con-
fidentiality, integrity and other security-related mechanisms. Authentication
is typically performed in the beginning of communication. However, security-
critical systems often require repeated authentication either periodically or
before performing important operations.
Scientific literature and the industry utilise multiple entity authentication
methods, which depend on specific systems and entity types. As mentioned
above, we analyse authentication procedure of two separate types: user and
device identities. During user identity authentication, a human user is typi-
cally asked for the following [9]:
1. Something a user knows. In this case, a user possesses knowledge of a
secret which can be used as a proof of identity. The most commonly
used secret type is a password that a user provides together with his/her
unique user name, which identifies the entity. There are other ways cre-
ated to identify users utilising their knowledge, including recognition
of graphical images, drawing patterns on screen [56] or even on the
back side of mobile devices [18]. However, such inventive authentica-
tion methods are incapable of replacing passwords in a widespread use,
because, in comparison to passwords, they provide little advantage in
security and usability and are inferior to passwords in authentication
system’s deployability [10].
2. Something a user has. In this case, the system checks user’s possession
of certain items, i.e. tokens, data containers or other secrets that a user
does not keep in his/her memory. Everyday devices, such as a smart
phone or a Bluetooth (BT) token [17], may also be utilised as tokens if
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the secret information is stored and kept in a secure manner. Compared
to the previous case, possession of an item frees the user from having to
learn and remember secret phrases. Furthermore, it enables more fre-
quent authentication to repeatedly verify user’s presence, which would
be too intrusive if passwords were used for authentication. However, it
is generally doubted whether a token really proves the identity of the
user, since these items can be easily shared among multiple users, lost
or even stolen [17]. Thus, this type of authentication is more suitable
for authentication of actual devices rather than human users that carry
them.
3. Something that is characteristic to the user. In this case, the user is
reliably identified by determining his/her unique features, i.e. genetic
traits, e.g. fingerprints, voice pattern, eye retina or DNA, and com-
paring this data to equivalent data obtained during user’s registration
[58]. However, this method raises concern about potential unintended
use and theft of digitised biometric information, since, unlike passwords
or physical tokens, biometric information is bound to a user, it does
not change and thus cannot be revoked [9]. Furthermore, it is possible
to make copies of this information, e.g. photographs or gelatin finger-
print patterns, which may then be used to fake body parts involved in
authentication [9, 48]. It is possible to prevent this kind of attack by
supervising devices and premises involved in authentication, but it is
not technically feasible for all systems and services.
This user-presented information obtained directly from the user or by
performing certain digital operations, e.g. scanning a fingerprint image and
afterwards calculating a pattern, is called credentials. After they are obtained
from the user, credentials are sent to a certain security authority or policy
enforcement point for verification.
An alternative method to identity a user is by analysing his/her behavior,
e.g. gait, file system browsing or other behavioural patterns, as specified by
De Luca et al. [18]. However, as the authors specify, these techniques are
susceptible to attacks, because the behaviour can be recorded and replayed,
thus they are rarely used in secure systems.
Device authentication is similar to user authentication, although less com-
plicated. We classify it into two categories:
1. Something a device has. This case involves secrets stored in the device
that are used to prove its identity and is generally used to enable user
authentication with a token described above. As in the case of human
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users, the secrets may be transferred and checked in a certain authen-
tication authority. Alternatively, a device may use a secret to derive
another piece of information that is accepted as a reliable proof by the
authenticator. Challenge-response and certificate-based authentication
mechanisms are based on this concept. It is important to emphasise
that although device authentication items, e.g. a X.509 certificate, are
effectively issued to users for user authentication, they are often used
in an automatic matter and do not ensure user’s presence at exact mo-
ment, even though a login or periodic presence verification procedure
is used [17]. Thus, secrets stored in a device should be treated as a
means to authenticate devices and not users.
2. Something that is characteristic to a device. This option enables de-
termining device identity by its behavioural or physical context cre-
dentials, e.g. geographic or low-level operational features, such as
frequency of transmitted signals [3]. However, although suitable for
authentication, these credentials are considered context-based rather
than identity-based, thus they are not suitable for detection of a spe-
cific identity, not to mention its verification.
2.1.4 Entity Authorisation and Accounting
Although authentication enables reliably detecting identities of communicat-
ing parties, it is often insufficient for access to a certain resource or commu-
nication in a system. Typically, a system contains resources or functionality
that is accessible to specific and limited sets of users, e.g. private data of
a specific user. To enable control over the mentioned features, the system
has to check if the authenticated entity is allowed to access the requested
data and functionality. Thus, authentication is followed by authorisation,
i.e. a process that involves analysing entity’s rights in the system [61]. This
procedure is performed in a policy decision point and typically compares se-
curity policy for a requested resource with permissions and entitlements of
the authenticated entity that requests it. As specified by Rotondi et al. [52],
there are several access control mechanisms, including the following:
1. Access Control Lists (ACLs) enable explicitly specifying individ-
ual actions that an entity, which is called a subject, is allowed to per-
form with specific resources, which are called objects. A generalised,
more systematic approach of this technique is Access Control Matrix
(ACM), which enables specifying access rights in a matrix, where ma-
trix elements are subject-object pairs. However, both ACLs and ACM
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approaches are complicated to manage when the number of subjects or
objects in a system is large.
2. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) helps solving the rights man-
agement problem mentioned above by introducing an additional role
layer. This technique allows associating access rights to roles rather
specific subjects. Thus, a role can be treated as a subset of actions.
Afterwards, one or more roles are assigned to each subject, thus allow-
ing the latter to perform operations defined by one or more access right
subsets.
3. Discretionary Access Control and Mandatory Access Control
focus on the issuer of access rights. In Discretionary Access Control, the
resource owner, typically a human user, specifies who or what can access
his/her resources. Conversely, Mandatory Access Control involves a
central administration that determines the rights of subjects to access
system’s objects.
4. Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC), unlike previously de-
scribed models, grants access to resources based on attributes of iden-
tities rather than identities themselves. However, this method does
not enable detecting specific identities and is thus not suitable for the
systems we analyse in this thesis.
To further increase security of the system, operations of an entity are
often recorded. This procedure is called accounting, and is more often used
for logging human user operations in order to gather proof for investigation
of security breaches and prevent non-repudiation.
Servers responsible for authentication, authorisation and accounting
are typically called Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting (AAA)
servers.
2.1.5 IdM System Models
As mentioned above, identities are issued and managed by IdM systems.
Such a system also performs authentication and authorisation of identities in
a specified scope. However, this does not mean that an IdM system serves at
most one Service Provider (SP). Based on agreements and shared standards
for identity data, as well as its exchange mechanisms, a single IdM system
may be utilised by multiple SPs. This is especially common in user-oriented
domains. User IdM system models, i.e. those operating on user identities,
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are traditionally classified into three categories: isolated, federated and cen-
tralised [27]. Besides the differences in IdM models, types of identities also
differ depending on specific IdM models, which are explained together with
the models below.
1. Isolated IdM model requires that each service contains its own IdM
system. In this case, the IdM system maintains separate identities along
with isolated identifiers for each user, thus every user has a separate
identity per every service he/she uses.To utilise such a system, a user
creates a virtual identity, representing only a subset of the entire user’s
identity (all the data known about the user) necessary for a user’s
actions in a particular domain of a service [31].
Although this model is used in most of the systems, it has a disad-
vantage of not being scalable from perspectives of both the user and
SP. As the number of a system’s users increases, IdM at a SP’s side
requires more resources, including hardware, bandwidth and human
personnel. From the customer’s perspective, a person that utilises ser-
vices provided by multiple providers has to manage credentials for all
the accounts. This imposes additional effort needed for creation of
an account and accessing it later in order to use the service. Fur-
thermore, since most of the systems authenticate users by requesting
passwords (although alternatives exist, as specified above), this creates
issues related to password reuse, data leaks and limited human memory
capabilities [10].
2. A federated system model enables sharing identity information
among multiple parties that trust each other and have standardised
procedures to map identity fields. These communicating parties, form-
ing a federated group, accept the same identifier provided by a user.
In practical implementations, a number of domains acting as Identity
Providers (IdPs) control identity data and authenticate users. The
same or other parties in the federated group, e.g. SPs, request trusted
IdPs to authenticate a user and provide user’s identity information.
In this case, a user creates an identity by providing personal details
that are afterwards stored in one or multiple IdPs. Afterwards, when a
user wishes to access a service, a certain trusted IdP authenticates the
user and provides the service with a subset of stored identity attributes
defined with relationship agreements.
Federated IdM system model reduces the effort needed for a user to
start using a service and manage his/her credentials. Furthermore,
since authentication in this model is performed by an IdP, the model
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enables SSO service. SSO simplifies utilisation of multiple services by
requiring one-time user authentication, after which a user is provided
seamless access to multiple potentially unrelated services that use the
same IdP. In Section 3.2, we present several currently utilised IdM
systems that provide SSO feature and are based on this model.
3. A centralised IdM system model strictly defines the roles and
relationships among systems: there is one IdP that manages user au-
thentication and identity information, and one or more SPs that use
the identity information. The IdP has to be trusted by both the cus-
tomers and the service providers. This model also enables SSO feature
and reduces user’s effort to use a new service, if there are other services
in the same domain that are already used. In this model, a user is
allowed to create one or more virtual identities, introduced together
with isolated IdM model. However, virtual identities issued by an IdP
are not linked to each other, although they are typically based on the
same identity in the IdP [31].
Besides user authentication, current services and systems impose new
requirements for IdM systems. For example, some systems enable access
rights delegation, which enables third parties to perform actions on the au-
thenticated user’s behalf. Furthermore, increasingly popular smart phones
stimulate the trend of mobile applications that deal with challenges imposed
by mobility, e.g. user or network mobility and multi-homing. Thus, they cre-
ate a need for new modern solutions in identification management systems.
Several modern systems addressing these issues are analysed in Section 3.2.
2.2 Communication Technologies
In this section, we specify the other aspect of the thesis’ topic, that is mod-
ern communication technologies. We do not provide specific details about
implementations, but rather define the general ideas of these technologies.
2.2.1 M2M Communications
M2M communications is a broad term describing any technology that enables
networked devices to exchange information and perform actions without man-
ual assistance of human personnel [59]. Besides performing tasks specific to
their system’s functionality, these devices act as independent network nodes,
capable of initiating communication by sending messages to other devices as
well as responding to incoming requests.
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An M2M system potentially comprises a wide variety of both simple and
intelligent devices, such as sensors, actuators and controllers. These devices
can be connected together by utilising various wired and wireless network
technologies, e.g. Ethernet, Wi-Fi, ZigBee and Universal Mobile Telecom-
munications System (UMTS). M2M is expected to utilise currently available,
open and standardised device and communication technologies to create in-
telligent applications and services that are scalable, reliable and, most im-
portantly, cheap to deploy and maintain [39]. This technology is also related
to IoT technology, a vision that refers to connecting all common devices
and non-electronic items, i.e. things, to the Internet, as discussed below. A
system with such a large number of connected nodes increases the effort of
network management, making it extremely expensive and even impossible to
perform it manually. Thus, automation provided by M2M becomes essential.
The scope of application provided by M2M technology is rather wide.
Some of the areas expected to utilise M2M technology identified by Potter
et al. [51] include smart metering, automotive applications, residential, com-
mercial and large-area automation as well as E-health. These applications
operate in diverse environments and create different challenges. Thus, as
the authors note, there is no single optimal solution covering all of these
application areas.
Technologies similar to M2M have been present for a long time. The
concept of M2M technology originates from telemetry, designed for automatic
measurement and transmission of data using wired or wireless technologies
[28]. The difference between telemetry and M2M is that the latter utilises
more common, open, standardised and ubiquitously used technologies. For
example, a predecessor of M2M, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) system also utilises a similar network that includes sensors and
actuators [39]. However, in SCADA, the controlled devices are connected in a
wired-manner to a central server, which is responsible for polling the sensors
and hence acquiring data. Furthermore, SCADA is based on proprietary
technologies, making the system impractical due to limitations on system’s
scalability and flexibility as well as high costs, difficulties and large time
resources needed for system’s deployment and maintenance.
2.2.2 Internet of Things
IoT promotes the ideology that everything, from devices to ordinary things,
should be connected to the Internet [36]. As noted by Cisco [26], the term also
emphasises evolution of the Internet, since the current Internet is designed
for human user-oriented communications and user-based traffic flows. Thus,
new solutions are needed in order to support the continuously increasing
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growth of numbers of everyday things connected to the Internet, which has
already overtaken the number of connected human users. Furthermore, as
the author of the term IoT, Kevin Ashton [5], describes, the infrastructure
has to become capable of processing enormous load of device-generated data,
thus IoT is related not only to communications, but also endpoints, i.e. smart
servers and applications.
IoT is still in its early development phase and, as noted by Koreshoff et
al. [38], its definition is not stable yet. Furthermore, the precise position of
IoT technology is unclear. Although presented as a powerful communication
technology connecting devices and things in the global Internet structure,
IoT seems to be targeted more towards simple devices and things, with ap-
plications enabling asset tracking and quick item meta-data retrieval using
RFID tags, as well as environment monitoring using sensors [5, 49, 60]. In
the terms of the latter use case, IoT closely relates to M2M. In fact, Song
et al. [57] define IoT as an underlying technology providing connectivity for
M2M devices and protocols.
2.2.3 Ambient Intelligence
Another technology currently in development that is believed to enable ubiq-
uitous computing is AmI. AmI is a technology that enables various device-
based functionality, when devices are integrated in physical environments
and directly or through user’s devices provide him/her with functionality
[15]. For example, in a home environment, a system detects user’s presence,
and the latter can control the surrounding devices using voice commands [29].
Another example is a AmI-powered conference building, where the premises
are equipped with screens, Near-Field Communication (NFC) readers and
other devices enabling attendants to easily register to the conference and
sessions using their smartphones, obtain real-time conference progress infor-
mation and start their presentations by simply approaching the screen in
front of a presentation room [14].
Unlike the previously analysed technologies, AmI actually involves users
and minds their identities when providing services. On the other hand, AmI
is also related to the previously discussed technologies due to utilisation of
the same devices, including RFID and NFC-based equipment [14, 15].
However, envisioned AmI applications are limited to local environments,
and the largest effort of the technology’s research is based on detecting con-
text. For example, current scientific effort includes works related to general
detection of context using RFID and NFC [14, 15], user’s identity detection
based on biometrics [50], or interacting with user using voice commands and
learning to understand user’s behaviour and habits to improve application
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features [29]. Thus, this technology is focused on local user-to-environment
and user-to-device communication rather than device-to-device communica-
tion. Since our work focuses on device-to-device communication based on
user identities, AmI is not directly related to our work.
Chapter 3
State of the Art
This chapter analyses the state-of-the-art IdM systems utilised in ICT as
well as communication technologies related to ubiquitous device-to-device
communications. Since the goal of this thesis is to propose an IdM system
for autonomous user-oriented device communications, this chapter focuses on
IdM related to communicating parties and communications over the Internet
performed among entities.
As mentioned in Section 2.1.2, there are significant differences among
identities of human users and devices. Thus, the analysis of current imple-
mentations of IdM systems presented in the document is divided into two
parts. The first part presents systems that manage identities for devices and
items, e.g. the things in IoT. These systems are typically utilised by com-
mercial organisations for business purposes, e.g. asset tracking or equipment
management. The second category includes user-oriented IdM systems that
manage human user-related information. These systems are typically used
by user-oriented services, such as web services and applications. The further
3.1 Device-Oriented IdM Systems
In this section, we analyse identities and IdM systems related to devices. As
mentioned in Section 2.1.2, information related to devices is often treated
simply as meta-data rather than actual identities, although the current in-
crease in device intelligence and capabilities are reflected in new projects that
treat devices as independent peers with identities.
Quite surprisingly, identification of devices and acquisition of their further
information is largely based on RFID technology. It enables item identifi-
cation and meta-data acquisition based on RFID tags that are attached to
the mentioned items, e.g. baggage at an airport [53]. The applications are
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illustrated in the analysis of scientific work presented further.
3.1.1 Object Identifier for Meta-Data
Roussos and Chartier [53] describe utilisation of an Object Identifier (OID)
mechanism that identifies items using an identifier that follows Universal
Resource Identifier (URI) format and hence enables access to item meta-data
stored on the web. OIDs follow a tree structure, thus enabling definition of
complex relationships, including parents, siblings and children. The system
is intended to provide information about items, i.e. relatively static data.
Furthermore, OIDs may be reused for identification of different items, if
temporary object identification is sufficient.
Due to utilisation of URIs, the system depends on Domain Name System
(DNS). However, as the authors note, DNS services are managed locally by
network administrators, and no users from outside the domain, e.g. a com-
pany, can create or manage OIDs for items. Thus, this solution is restricted
to proprietary systems.
3.1.2 Cooltown
Another RFID-based device-related identity management system is
Cooltown, specified by Kindberg et al. [34, 37]. The system uses Infra-
Red (IR) and RFID to transfer identifiers of users, devices and places, i.e.
links to web-pages representing them, enabling so-called web-presence [37].
The web-pages are either hosted in the items themselves, e.g. in connected
devices, or external web-servers. These web-pages provide information and
services related to the represented entities. Furthermore, since entities are
web-present, the approach actually treats entity meta-data as identities.
In the broad sense, the system provides an AmI functionality, presented
in Section 2.2.3, where a user may interact with locally available services
presented by other entities in the environment using his/her device, e.g. a
mobile phone. Similarly to OID-based approach, Cooltown is based on DNS
services, thus creation of new identifiers is rather restricted.
3.1.3 Object Naming Service
Object Naming Service (ONS) built on top of DNS is yet another similar
identification technology that is based on DNS functionality for storing Name
Authority Pointer records containing information about the location of meta-
data of objects referred to by identifiers [53]. ONS was originally designed
in EPCGlobal system to map product class level information to a service
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point and description. Due to relation to DNS, the device meta-data may be
obtained by sending regular DNS queries.
Although ONS enables finding the exact location of meta-data storage,
it is merely a discovery service and thus storage and acquisition of the ac-
tual meta-data exceeds the scope of this technology. Therefore, in order to
find and obtain this data, operation of ONS must be combined with ad-
ditional protocols, which may complicate development and management of
such systems. Furthermore, ONS does not specify the way for obtaining
object identifiers. Since Electronic Product Code (EPC) is used to identify
products, it potentially identifies the objects by using RFID tags and bar-
codes. However, as indicated by Roussos and Chartier [53], ONS is now an
insecure, deprecated technology that has been replaced by EPC Discovery
Service.
3.2 User-Oriented IdM Systems
This section discusses application-level IdM systems for management of hu-
man user identities. We start by discussing features of OpenID in Section
3.2.1. Afterwards, Section 3.2.2 analyses Security Assertion Markup Lan-
guage (SAML) protocol. Then, Section 3.2.3 describes OAuth v2.0. Finally,
Section 3.2.4 discusses a recent protocol OpenID Connect.
3.2.1 OpenID
3.2.1.1 General Description
OpenID is an authentication protocol providing a user with a SSO feature
for accessing web-based services [45]. It is a decentralised IdM system, i.e. it
allows having multiple OpenID identity servers capable of providing identity
information to any service supporting OpenID authentication.
OpenID, with the currently newest version 2.0, is designed as an IdM
solution for access to websites and web applications. It involves three parties:
a User Agent (UA), controlled by a human user, a Relying Party (RelP),
which provides the service, and an OpenID Identity Provider (OIdP), which
authenticates the user and delivers his/her personal information to RelP
[45]. OIdP is identified by a URI. To use OpenID technology, a user has
to register in a selected OIdP and obtain an identifier called User-Provided
Identifier (UPID), which is needed later for authentication. A user may create
several identity profiles at the same OIdP and afterwards select a specific
identity to provide to a RelP, thus keeping control over private data. A user
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may also establish his own private OIdP server, which enhances control over
personal data. However, this requires technical competence that is higher
than possessed by typical users.
OpenID does not ensure any trust mechanisms for relationship manage-
ment between RelPs and OIdPs. Therefore, few service providers wish to
become RelPs, which is considered the main reason why OpenID did not
experience significant adoption [10].
3.2.1.2 Operation of OpenID
Authentication process in a website that supports OpenID login is initiated
by a user, i.e. by first loading the website in a UA, i.e. a web-browser.
The user then types in his/her identifier in the form of a Universal Resource
Locator (URL) or an Extensible Resource Identifier (XRI). The latter option
is available since OpenID version 2.0. A user can also provide the identifier
of an OIdP instead of the identifier of his/her identity [12, 45], in which case
he/she can choose an identity profile during authentication in OIdP.
Afterwards, RelP performs OIdP discovery based on the provided identi-
fier to find the endpoint URL for OIdP. RelP connects to the endpoint and
establishes a secure channel to exchange secret information and enable mes-
sage signing. Afterwards, RelP redirects the UA to a corresponding OIdP
for authentication and optionally identity profile selection.
Subsequently, the UA is redirected to RelP with an assertion of either a
successful or failed authentication. This assertion may also include subject-
related information. RelP validates and analyses the response, and either
allows or denies access to the service.
3.2.2 SAML
3.2.2.1 General Description
SAML is an authentication protocol that allows exchanging security asser-
tions between parties to enable SSO service [43]. These parties are secu-
rity domains with trust relationships established between them, thus SAML
enables enterprise authentication. The main principle of the protocol’s op-
eration is similar to OpenID discussed in Section 3.2.1. However, unlike in
OpenID, collaboration between a relying party and an identification provider
using SAML is performed only if the parties have a trust relationship and
potentially additional information utilisation contracts.
SAML involves three parties: SP, UA and IdP. A SP provides a service
valuable to the user. A UA is used by a human user, i.e. the subject, to obtain
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access to a service provided by a SP. Typically, UA is a desktop or mobile
web-browser. An IdP provides SP with identity information related to the
subject. In a typical scenario, when a user requests access to a service using
his/her UA, UA is redirected to the IdP where the user has to prove his/her
identity. Upon successful authentication, IdP sends identity information,
including authorisation and authentication-related attributes, as assertions
back to SP.
The current version of SAML protocol is 2.0, created after merging an
earlier version 1.1 with Shibbolleth and Identity Federation Framework (ID-
FF), developed by Liberty Alliance [47]. Earlier protocol versions 1.0 and 1.1
are now deprecated, thus further discussion addresses protocol version 2.0.
SAML protocol is comprised of the three following components [40]:
1. Messages that encapsulate data, e.g. security assertions;
2. Bindings that specify the means for transporting SAML messages;
3. Profiles that specify complete combinations of bindings that can be
used to perform authentication and authorisation.
SAML protocol messages are based on Extensible Markup Language
(XML) format. The fundamental SAML message type is security assertions,
which contain statements about a subject’s attributes and rights. A single
assertion message contains one or more statements of the following types:
1. Authentication Statement that provides information about the au-
thentication process, e.g. time and method and result of subject au-
thentication.
2. Authorisation Decision Statement that indicates whether access
to a requested resource has been granted.
3. Attribute Statement that provides additional information about the
authenticated subject.
Assertions also contain information about the issuer of the message, gen-
eral information about the subject and potentially indicate conditions of
token’s validity. For example, a token may be valid at a specific period of
time.
SAML also includes Authentication Request and Artifact Resolution mes-
sage types. Authentication Request specifies messages used for initiation of
subject authentication in the IdP, which are sent from the SP. Artifact Res-
olution messages enable SP and IdP exchange message references, which are
afterwards resolved in order to obtain the content of the messages.
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Besides message formats, SAML protocol specifies bindings and profiles.
Bindings [41] define how the messages are sent, and profiles [42] describe
a combination of bindings used for communication among specific parties.
For example, Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Redirect Binding en-
ables adding the SAML message into URL query string of a HTTP message.
However, due to URLs length limit, this option is suitable only for short
messages, such as Authentication Requests. Alternatively, POST Binding
enables putting a transferred message into a HTTP form that is forwarded
to another party (SP or IdP) through a UA. Furthermore, HTTP Artifact
Binding profile enables using UA to transfer message references as Artifact
Messages, which are used by the receiver to directly contact the sender and
obtain the actual message content.
3.2.2.2 Operation of SAML 2.0
SAML communication sequence begins when a subject uses his/her UA to
access a resource in a SP [42]. This invokes a security check for a given
resource at the SP. If the particular SP already contains a user-related se-
curity context, it simply checks the context for subject’s rights to access the
resource and afterwards returns the resource. Otherwise, SP tries to obtain
information about the user from an IdP it already knows about or discovered
using the Identity Provider Discovery protocol.
After obtaining information about the IdP, a SP creates a request for
IdP that includes authentication request message and RelayState parameter
describing the location of SP. This request is forwarded to IdP by the UA.
After receiving the request, IdP checks if it has a security context created
for the requested user identity and, if not, requests the user to prove his/her
identity. The SAML protocol standard does not specify authentication mech-
anisms for the IdP, thus passwords, allowing utilisation of certificates or any
stronger type of authentication. After successful authentication, IdP creates
a security context related to the user identity, meaning that the user is logged
in the IdP and future assertion requests are handled without the need for
the user to re-authenticate, thus enabling SSO service.
After authentication, IdP validates the request of SP and sends a re-
sponse back through the UA. The response contains security assertions and
RelayState parameter value initially issued by the SP. When forwarding the
response to SP through UA, the user might be asked for consent to transfer
his/her information to the SP.
Assertion Consumer (AC) validates the response, creates a security con-
text for the user at the SP for this and future uses and redirects the UA to
the requested resource.
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3.2.3 OAuth 2.0
3.2.3.1 General Description
OAuth 2.0 (further called OAuth2) is an authorisation framework. Unlike
previously discussed technologies, it does not focus on authenticating a user
and providing parties with the user’s identity information. Instead, it defines
a protocol for authorisation of a third party service, i.e. Client, to act on a
resource owner’s behalf when performing certain actions on a resource stored
in a Resource Server [33].
OAuth2, as a recent technology, addresses current needs, such as mobile
applications based on web-services. Unlike OAuth v1.0, which specifies its
own security mechanisms, OAuth2 relies on security provided by Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) protocol, which depends on Transport
Layer Security (TLS). Furthermore, OAuth2 enables obtaining long-time
possession of tokens by distinguishing short-time tokens and refresh tokens.
As discussed by Dennis [19], OAuth2 has an advantage over OpenID and
SAML 2.0 protocol because it does not use HTTP POST messages and thus
fully supports mobile clients, i.e. applications. In certain modes of SAML 2.0
and OpenID, assertions and authentication results, respectively, are sent in
HTTP POST messages. Mobile applications launched using URL obtained
as SAML response, do not have access to POST messages, thus cannot access
information sent in these messages. Although workarounds exist, this feature
of OpenID and SAML constrains mobile application development. Thus,
OAuth2 addresses this problem by using only HTTP redirects in UA for
message forwarding among parties and entirely avoiding utilisation of POST
messages.
OAuth2 specification [33] defines the following four parties involved in
the process of OAuth2-based authorisation:
1. Resource Owner (RO): an entity that possesses (contains rights to)
certain resources and is willing to grant a third party Client with access
to the resources.
2. Resource Server (RS): a server that contains the resource.
3. Client: a third-party application (web-based, mobile-based or other)
that desires to perform certain actions on a resource in RS.
4. Authorisation Server (AS): a server responsible for authenticating
the RO and issuing authorisation tokens to Clients allowing certain
operations on a resource.
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RS and AS roles can be performed by a single entity. It is noted that
relationship and interaction between these parties is beyond the scope of
SAML specification.
3.2.3.2 Operation of OAuth2
OAuth2 authorisation procedure begins when a Client sends an Authorisa-
tion Request to RO. The message can be sent directly to the RO or indirectly
through AS. At this step, the owner may be prompted to complete authen-
tication procedure. Afterwards, RO sends an Authorisation Grant back to
the Client. Authorisation Grant is generally an explicit owner’s agreement
indicating that the Client is allowed to use the resource. For example, it can
be a combination of a user-name and a password or an authentication code
received from an AS associated with the RS.
The Client uses the Authorisation Grant to request the AS for an Access
Token. The AS performs user (Resource Owner) authentication, validates
the Authorisation Token and issues an Access Token to the Client. Access
Tokens typically have limited lifetime. To enable token refreshment without
the need for user re-authentication, AS can also provide the Client with a
Refresh Token that can be used to obtain new Access Tokens.
Having the Access Token, the Client application can request permission
to perform certain operations with the resource on user’s behalf. In order
to do so, it sends a request with information about desired actions as well
as the Access Token to the RS, where the resource is located. Afterwards,
RS validates the Access Token and performs the requested operations. Val-
idation method is not defined in the specification, but it typically involves
collaboration between RS and AS.
As it is noticed by Dennis [19], unlike authentication response in SAML
2.0, OAuth2 Authorisation Grant and Access Token, obtained by the Client
after user’s authentication and authorisation, does not provide the Client
with user identity information. Thus, an additional request to the AS is
needed to validate the Token and to obtain certain user identity data as a
resource. On the other hand, this enables invalidating the Access Token on
the server side if the token is compromised and thus forbidding the Client’s
further access to a specific resource.
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3.2.4 OpenID Connect
3.2.4.1 General Description
As discussed in Section 3.2.3, OpenID and SAML do not support mobile
applications. Although OAuth2 addresses this problem, there are multiple
important aspects that are not defined by OAuth2 specification, which leads
to differences and thus non-interoperability of implementations. Further-
more, OAuth2 is designed for third party authorisation, i.e. delegation of
rights, rather than authentication. As noted in OpenID Connect specifica-
tion [54], OAuth specification includes methods for obtaining Access Tokens
needed for accessing resources, but omits definition of access to user identity
information.
OpenID Connect (current version 1.0) [46] addresses these and other is-
sues of predecessor protocols and is described by its creators as Application
Programming Interface (API)-friendly technology that enables protocol sup-
port for native and mobile applications. It is ”a simple identity layer on
top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol. It allows Clients to verify the identity of the
End-User based on the authentication performed by an Authorization Server,
as well as to obtain basic profile information about the End-User in an in-
teroperable and REST-like manner” [46]. OpenID Connect is an extension
of OAuth2 providing authentication functionality, thus it largely depends on
OAuth2 for authorisation and flow of messages. OpenID Connect also de-
fines most of the out of scope parts of OAuth2, thus providing a complete
authentication framework specification.
OpenID specification defines the roles of OpenID connect members based
on OAuth2 definitions. For example, a RelP is described as OAuth2 Client
that requests Claims (information asserted about specific entities). Similarly,
an OpenID Provider is defined as OAuth2 Authorisation Server capable of
providing a RelP with requested Claims.
3.2.4.2 Operation of OpenID Connect
OpenID Connect Core specification [55] defines three message flows, specif-
ically Authorisation Code Flow, Implicit Flow and Hybrid Flow that in-
volve different endpoints for issuing tokens. In this section, we analyse Basic
Client’s implementation [54], which uses Authorisation Code Flow, that uses
Token Endpoint to issue all the tokens.
Authentication procedure begins when a RelP prepares and sends an
Authentication Request, which specifies a request to authenticate and/or
return identity data about a user, to an Authorisation Server. If needed,
the latter authenticates the user and asks the latter if RelP is allowed to
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access user’s personal data. Authorisation Server then provides the RelP
with a response that includes a code (an equivalent of Authorisation Token
in OAuth2). RelP uses this data structure to request a Token Endpoint
for access to user data. After receiving this request, Token Endpoint
provides a RelP with ID and Access Tokens, as well as potentially a Refresh
Token [54]. ID Token contains information about the authentication event.
Among the required parameters, such as the issuer and subject identifiers as
well as expiration time, it may include details about authentication processes
that were performed.
Identity information access functionality is managed by UserInfo
Endpoint. After RelP receives an Access Token, it can use this token to
request UserInfo Endpoint for user identity-related information. Iden-
tity information set that is returned by UserInfo Endpoint depends on
Access Token and previously described Access Token acquisition step. In or-
der to specify requested identity information set, a RelP specifies requested
identity fields in the scope parameter that is included in the request for
Access Token sent to Token Endpoint. scope may include request for
user profile information, email, address and phone number request values.
However, it always includes openid value identifying that the request is an
OpenID Connect request.
As mentioned, OpenID Connect specification also fills multiple gaps that
are present in OAuth2. One of the most criticised shortcomings of OAuth2
is the lack of definition of Access Token validation performed in the Autho-
risation Server. OpenID Connect defines validation procedure not only for
Access Tokens, but also for ID Tokens and other related security parame-
ters. Similarly to OAuth2, OpenID Connect uses TLS for securing message
transmission.
3.3 Communication for Ubiquitous Comput-
ing
This section discusses various industrial approaches of communication sys-
tems used for ubiquitous computing. We start with a rather thorough dis-
cussion of European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) M2M
architecture specification in Section 3.3.1, and briefly analyse other related
efforts afterwards.
CHAPTER 3. STATE OF THE ART 35
3.3.1 ETSI M2M System Architecture
One of the important M2M communication standards developed by ETSI [25]
defines M2M system’s functional architecture. This section thoroughly anal-
yses ETSI architecture from the perspectives of communicating components,
their identification and communication.
3.3.1.1 Architecture Components
In ETSI architecture, an M2M network consists of a number of different
hierarchically-ordered components that communicate with each other to per-
form high-level system’s functionality, as presented in Figure 3.1. In the top-
most level, ETSI-specified system consists of Device and Gateway Domain
and Network Domain. The Device and Gateway Domain is comprised of the
following elements:
1. M2M Device(s), responsible for running M2M Applications (referred
to as Device Applications (DAs)) using M2M Device Service Capabil-
ities Layer (DSCL). For example, a DA may be responsible for mea-
suring environment conditions and periodically sending data to other
devices in the domain or to the M2M Core Network (CN) in Network
Domain, by utilising M2M Area or Access Network, respectively. M2M
devices may also provide connectivity to M2M legacy devices which are
not compliant to ETSI standards. In this thesis, we refer to M2M De-
vices as D nodes.
2. M2M Gateway, which functions as a proxy between M2M devices
and CN. Similarly to M2M Devices, a Gateway also runs M2M Appli-
cations (referred to as Gateway Applications (GAs)) on top of M2M
Gateway Service Capabilities Layer (GSCL). In simple scenarios, it
can function as a mere repeater, relaying the packets between M2M
devices and CN. However, it often performs more sophisticated oper-
ations, e.g. aggregation and compression of data received from M2M
Devices, and afterwards transmission of this processed data to M2M
Core Network. Such gateway capabilities enable reducing the number
and size of messages sent from one domain to another. There can be
multiple Gateways in the Device and Gateway Domain. Furthermore,
Gateways can also provide connectivity to legacy M2M devices that
are not compliant with ETSI architecture. We refer to M2M Gateways
as G nodes.
3. M2M Area Network, which enables connectivity between M2M
devices and M2M Gateway. It may be based on Wireless Private
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Figure 3.1: ETSI M2M functional architecture [25, 35]
Area Network (WPAN) technologies, e.g. Bluetooth, ZigBee and
ISA100.11a, or use local network technologies, such as Wi-Fi, Pro-
grammable Logic Controller (PLC) and Meter-Bus (M-Bus). Utilisa-
tion of short-range networks allows minimising consumption of energy
needed for communication, thus prolonging lifetime of energy-restricted
M2M nodes.
Network Domain consists of:
1. M2M Access Network, which enables communication among M2M
Devices and/or Gateways and CN. It is typically a large area network
based on a long-range communication technology, e.g. x Digital Sub-
scriber Line (xDSL), satellite link, Wireless Local Area Network (W-
LAN) and Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX).
2. M2M Core Network, which is primarily responsible for providing
M2M Devices and Gateways with IP connectivity to the global In-
ternet. Additionally, it runs service and network control functions,
provides roaming and interconnection with other networks. CN types
defined in the specification include, among others, 3rd Generation Part-
nership Project (3GPP) CNs, ETSI Telecommunications and Internet
Converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN)
CN and 3rd Generation Partnership Project 2 (3GPP2) CN. In this
thesis, we also refer to this component as N node.
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3. M2M Service Capabilities, which is a layer of abstraction that pro-
vides common functions and hides network and technology specifics.
These functions can be used by M2M Applications. To differentiate
this layer from similar Service Capabilities layers in M2M Devices and
Gateways, we refer to it as Network Service Capabilities Layer (NSCL).
4. M2M Applications, which utilise M2M NSCL to run service logic.
These applications are responsible for high-level system’s logic and user
interface utilised by consumers to access the system’s services. We refer
to applications running in Network Domain as Network Applications
(NAs).
The Network Domain also includes two layers of management functions:
Network Management Functions Layer and M2M Management Functions
Layer.
As mentioned above, some DAs are running in devices that do not have a
Service Capabilities Layer (SCL) or are even ETSI-incompatible. Thus, M2M
devices are classified into three categories. The first category comprises de-
vices that contain a SCL and are ETSI-compatible. The second category
contains ETSI-compatible devices that do not have a SCL. Such devices use
dIa Reference Point (RP) to connect to a Gateway and utilise the latter’s
GSCL. Finally, the third category is comprised of legacy devices that do not
have a SCL and are ETSI-incompatible. These devices can be connected to
the network through a D or G node by using Gateway Interworking Proxy
(GIP) or Device Interworking Proxy (DIP) capabilities, respectively, pro-
vided by the supporting device’s SCL. ETSI does not specify the connection
between a legacy device and the node that connects it to the network. Like
in [25], we refer to the devices of the three categories as D Device (DD), D’
Device (D’D) and d Device (dD), respectively. Connections between these
devices and other architecture components are shown in Figure 3.1.
3.3.1.2 Identities in M2M Network
M2M systems utilise identities to establish robust and secure connections
between network components and to communicate afterwards. This section
discusses IdM system specified in ETSI functional M2M architecture [25].
Identifiers in M2M Network The overall functioning of ETSI M2M
system is based on a set of identifiers defining different components of the
system. Based on ETSI specification, this set is divided into two identi-
fier models. The first model consists of identifiers that are used by the
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features specified in the specification. More specifically, these are M2M com-
ponents and their logical relationships, defining the ETSI M2M platform.
The specification focuses on the latter model of identifiers, and the provided
instructions related to these identifiers are normative. Since an M2M system
greatly depends on underlying communications network (at least for the Ac-
cess Network part), there is another hierarchy of identifiers that addresses
identification and communication at lower level, concerning mostly SP and
Access Network (AcN) parts. However, these lower-level communications are
out of scope of the specification and the provided details are merely informa-
tive. Therefore, in this thesis we focus on the first model, and mention only
the important aspects of the second model.
The following are the components that comprise the normative model of
identifiers:
1. Application Identifier (App-ID) uniquely identifies an M2M Ap-
plication registered at a certain SCL. If there is more than one instance
of the same application registered at the same SCL, App-IDs must be
unique. App-ID is used by other parties for interaction with the appli-
cation.
2. Node Identifier (Node-ID) identifies a node, i.e. the logical rep-
resentation of components in a M2M Device (D Node), Gateway (G
Node) or Network Device, registered with a particular SP. A node
is comprised of a SCL, M2M Service Bootstrap Function (MSBF) and
M2M Service Connection Function (MSCF). A Node-ID is created dur-
ing M2M Bootstrap procedure or when pre-provisioning a D/G Node
with SP configuration parameters. If a device registers with several
SPs, then there can be multiple nodes deployed on a M2M device or
gateway, but they all must have unique Node-IDs.
3. SCL Identifier (SCL-ID) uniquely identifies a SCL. According to
the specification [25], SCL-ID may have the same value as Node-ID.
4. Service Connection Identifier (CONN-ID) identifies the connec-
tion between a DSCL/GSCL and NSCL. Such a connection is used for
communication between a D/G Node and the Network. A connection
between the parties is not permanent, i.e. after it is terminated, it
can be re-established or even replaced with a new connection, thus the
CONN-ID of a connection between two parties is not static and can
change in time.
5. Service Provider Identifier (PROV-ID) identifies a SP. The value
of this identifier is unique and static.
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6. MSBF Identifier (MSBF-ID) is a unique and static value that iden-
tifies a MSBF. MSBF-ID is assigned by a SP.
7. MAS Identifier (MAS-ID) is a unique and static value identifying
a M2M Authentication Server (MAS) and is provided by a SP.
In addition to the mentioned model, the specification provides an infor-
mative part about lower-level identification used for addressing and commu-
nication purposes, and instructions for mapping between the two models (see
Figure 3.2). The lower-level model consists of two layers: M2M Service De-
vice Level and M2M Transport Device Level. M2M Service Device Level is
further divided into M2M Application Identifier, M2M Service Subscription
Identifier and M2M Service Device Identifier. M2M Transport Device Level
identifier set consists of M2M Access Network Subscription Identifier, M2M
Access Network Device Identifier and M2M Access Network Address.
Distinction of the layers enables a logical and potentially physical sepa-
ration of functionality provided by a high-level SP and lower-level communi-
cation part, based on capabilities of Access Network Provider (ANP). It also
implies that identifiers in different layers are utilised by different parties, i.e.
SP and ANP.
The lower-level model of identifiers addresses the two cases when SP and
ANP are the same entity and when they are separate entities associated
with a pre-established relationship. Furthermore, these two layers can refer
to a single or two separate physical devices (a service device and a transport
device). For example, a D’D contains only Service Device Level identifiers,
whereas the Gateway the device connects to provides the Transport Device
Level identifiers.
Some of the lower-level identifiers can be omitted in the implementation
of the network. For example, a DD acts as both a Service and Transport
Figure 3.2: Low-level identification system of ETSI M2M architecture [25]
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Device, which means that the hardware information is the same in both
levels. In this case, Access Network Device Identifier is sufficient and M2M
Service Device Identifier is redundant. Furthermore, when the SP is the
same entity as ANP, the M2M Service Subscription Identifier carries the
same information as the M2M Access Network Subscription Identifier, thus
one of them can be omitted.
Connectivity in the Access Network may be enabled by diverse technolo-
gies, e.g. UMTS, a satellite connection and xDSL, as mentioned in Section
3.3.1. The choice of a communication technology may influence the identifier
formats used in the system’s implementation.
Identification and Connection of D/G nodes In order to provide se-
cure M2M communications, node identification and authentication processes
are of prime importance. In ETSI M2M system, this is addressed with a
hierarchy of keys, identifiers and a set of procedures that are utilised to iden-
tify a D/G node during connection establishment between the node and the
M2M system.
The top-level key used in M2M identification process is the M2M Root
Key (Kmr). This key allows authentication and key agreement between a
D/G Node and the SP. Kmr depends on Node-ID and PROV-ID, thus every
M2M node has a separate Kmr shared with the SP. Furthermore, a Kmr
is used to generate M2M Connection Keys (Kmcs) and afterwards M2M
Application Keys (Kmas). Kmc is involved in authentication of a M2M
connection. Similarly, Kma is utilised in authentication and authorisation of
an M2M application. In addition to that, Kma allows protecting the data
traffic of an application. Keys Kmc and Kma are derived using CONN-IDs
and App-IDs, respectively.
A device may obtain a Kmr needed for further key generation in several
ways. Kmr may be preconfigured, i.e. stored in a device’s Secured Environ-
ment Domain, e.g. in a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) module.
Alternatively, the device may be provisioned with the material required to
generate the keys, including Kmr, during service bootstrap. As the speci-
fication describes, Node-ID, SCL-ID and a list of NSCLs identifiers can be
produced as additional elements of M2M service bootstrap.
There are multiple ways to perform the bootstrap procedure, depend-
ing on equipment and communication technologies that are present in the
network and whether Access Network provides assistance. In the Access
Network-assisted scenario, a node can obtain the information required for
key derivation and to locate other network members by utilising network
credentials. Independent scenarios, however, are based on pre-provisioned
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information set by the manufacturer in D/G devices. For example, Identity-
Based Authenticated Key Exchange (IBAKE)-based automated bootstrap-
ping procedure requires pre-provisioned identifiers, as well as a pre-shared
secret (key or a password). Thus, in this case the same information would
be separately and securely provisioned into the D/G devices and the MAS
before deploying the system.
ETSI specification also defines a temporary service connection that is
established between a D/G node and the service provider in order to gain
connectivity and access to MSBF which is then used to perform service boot-
strap. However, in order to create a temporary connection, the connecting
node has to be pre-configured with service provider address as well as identity
and secret parameters.
After a D/G performs M2M bootstrap and service connection procedures,
it contains Kmr and Kmc keys, as well as mId RP. This information can be
used by the node to perform service registration procedure, which involves
registration of a node’s SCL in the NSCL. In addition to that, when applica-
tions are registered in the node’s SCL and Kmas are generated, the node can
communicate with other nodes in the network via the Network node. Thus,
it can either request or provide functionality enabled by M2M applications.
3.3.1.3 Addressing of Applications
Communication of devices and applications is based on a feature of ETSI
M2M architecture called M2M Point of Contact (PoC). PoC is used by M2M
network to locate the device’s SCL and afterwards the required application
by looking up the information related to the targeted SCL that is stored
in NSCL and translating it into a URI or IP address. These addresses are
then used to perform communication with the device and application using
Representational State Transfer (REST) protocol. The further part of this
section contains a description of a D/G node SCL and application registration
procedure, as well as processes performed to locate and reach the desired
application.
Initially, when a D/G node is connecting to the network, it has to per-
form bootstrap, network and service connection as well as service registration
procedures, as described above. During service registration, a SCL (DSCL
or GSCL) has to register to a NSCL. When performing this procedure, the
registering node creates a SCL resource, i.e. a data structure, in NSCL to
provide the latter with information of the node’s SCL. This resource contains
another resource, M2MPoC, which holds information specifying how to reach
the registered SCL, i.e. the D/G node that contains it.
After SCL registration, M2M applications can register in the local SCL.
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Similarly to SCL registration in NSCL, this procedure involves creation of
another resource application that stores information about an application,
but in this case the information is stored in the local SCL, i.e. located in the
same node as the applications. The SCL can then also register applications
in the remote SCL, i.e. NSCL. The ETSI specification does not specify what
and when decides to register the application in NSCL, thus it is assumed
that it depends on the implementation specifics of the application and the
system.
After the application registration is complete, NSCL knows about the
SCL and the applications that have registered to it. Thereafter, it might be
requested by some other party, e.g. an application in another D/G node, to
send a REST request to one of these applications. To successfully locate and
address a destination application, NSCL performs a two-step approach using
PoC information:
1. NSCL locates the SCL where the application is registered by analysing
the PoC information. It can be either DSCL in a DD or GSCL. In
the case of a DA running in D’D or dD, the NSCL would try to locate
the GSCL to which the mentioned D nodes are attached. Information
about the SCL’s location is taken from the M2MPoC resource stored
in NSCL.
2. NSCL transfers the request to the located SCL. The request contains
identification (App-ID) of the target application. The local SCL then
locates the target application and delivers the request to it.
It is emphasised that for a SCL to reach NSCL, PoC functionality is not
needed, because the former is expected to already contain information about
the NSCL, which is initially used for SCL registration. D/G nodes are pre-
provisioned with this information (e.g. in a UICC card), or provided with it
during bootstrap procedure.
The scheme of location detection and addressing of an application also
supports advanced connection features, such as multi-homing and mobility.
In the case of multi-homing, an SCL simply provides an NSCL with several
M2MPoC resource records. In case of mobility, an SCL is provided with
capabilities of refreshing the location and accessibility values in M2MPoC
resources of NSCL. Furthermore, the specification allows service capabilities
to decide which of the registered channels to reach a node registered in a
SCL, thus the best connection of those specified with M2MPoC resources
can be selected. Finally, the architecture is capable of detecting situations
when a D/G node is not reachable, e.g. when no response can be received.
In such a situation, the connection specified by M2MPoC entry in NSCL is
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marked as ”not reachable”, which makes the system use alternative ways for
contacting the device, e.g. by sending wake up messages using Short Message
Service (SMS) [25].
3.3.2 MTC Standard
Machine-Type Communications (MTC) is a type of M2M communications
that uses Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) technology as the Access
Network. A mechanism of such communications is specified by 3GPP [1, 2].
According to the specifications, MTC is a type of communication that in-
volves at least one device that does not necessarily require human interac-
tion. However, as identified by Song et al. [57], whereas the presented ETSI
M2M architecture focuses on the functional M2M aspects and specifies a fully
connected functional platform, standards provided by 3GPP are related to
signalling and communication among distinct devices.
MTC specification defines transport, subscriber management and M2M
device triggering based on 3GPP access technologies, e.g. UMTS. Unlike
ETSI specification, MTC treats all devices uniformly as User Equipment
(UE). Thus, enhancements of MTC created for M2M communications are
also available for regular communication devices, e.g. mobile phones.
MTC defines communication among UA located in UE and an MAS lo-
cated outside the operator domain. To support communication between the
two parties, MTC specifies two additional components:
1. Services Capability Server (SCS), which connects AS to the net-
work. SCS may be controlled by the mobile operator or the provider
of MTC service that provides the applications.
2. MTC Interworking Function (MTC-IWF), which is an additional
control node for MTC, located in the home network. It is mainly
responsible for device identification and triggering. As mentioned in
[57], this component uses E.164 MSISDN or External Identifier to find
the equivalent International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) of a
device and decide on the best triggering method, such as sending an
SMS that includes an Application Port Identifier indicating a targeted
application.
Unlike ETSI M2M architecture specification that defines two sets of iden-
tifier systems, MTC uses only two identifiers, i.e. internal and external iden-
tifiers. The internal identifier, i.e. IMSI, is defined inside the core network
and has local scope of validity. The external identifier consists of the domain
and local identifiers, specifying entity in the operator’s domain.
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3.3.3 oneM2M
The capabilities of M2M technology have encouraged standardisation pro-
cesses performed by a number of organisations, including the already men-
tioned ETSI and 3GPP, which lead to potential incompatibilities and iso-
lated vertical structures. In order to address this problem, ETSI together
with other organisations have formed a global M2M organisation, oneM2M,
established in order to enable global M2M communications by defining a
common M2M service layer [44, 57]. It also addresses coordination of devel-
opment processes associated with the current M2M service layer standards
and common features based on needs of vertical market aspects.
With a common service layer, oneM2M seeks to define methods for var-
ious functions, including M2M protocols, APIs, security, privacy, reachabil-
ity, discovery and management. oneM2M expects to minimise deployment
expenses, simplify application development, reduce the time-to-market and
prevent overlaps of standards.
Chapter 4
Vision and Requirements
The future of communications involves participation of multiple various de-
vices finding and interacting with each other to achieve individual or common
goals. This chapter presents our vision of an IdM system that supports dy-
namic communications among multiple devices and thus enables advanced
user-oriented applications. An analysis of incapabilities and drawbacks re-
lated to current device communication technologies discussed in Chapters 2
and 3 is presented in Section 4.1. Afterwards, Section 4.2 thoroughly de-
scribes the vision of our system. Section 4.3 describes the indicated imposed
on the envisaged system. Finally, Section 4.4 presents several use cases of
how our envisaged system could be used.
4.1 Problem Description
Currently, there are two prominent approaches to intelligent device-to-device
communications: M2M and IoT. As described in Section 2.2.1, M2M is a tech-
nology that enables communication among devices with no or minimal hu-
man intervention. Although M2M communications technology is attracting
large interest, the current M2M technology specifications and implementa-
tion cases [1, 21–25] are static, proprietary and limited to specific application
areas. Therefore, M2M systems consist of ad-hoc devices that communicate
with other pre-defined devices, which leads to a problem of multiple isolated
vertical systems, described by Clayman and Galis silos [16]. Furthermore,
these systems omit the concept of an owner or a system’s user, because it
is assumed that each of the private systems are utilised and managed by
separate isolated users.
Another approach to enable intelligent communication among devices is
IoT. As noted by Cisco [26], IoT is an evolutionary step of the Internet that
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is now becoming a communication media not only for human users, but also
for intelligent devices. That is, IoT is responsible for carrying large amounts
of machine-type information, not intended to be processed or utilised directly
by users. Unlike M2M, IoT enables connecting any and every device with
each other if needed, thus the scope of peers any device can reach is not
limited. Furthermore, IoT devices are not dedicated to a single application
and can be aware of the context that includes human users.
Although IoT potentially allows global device communications, the in-
frastructure consisting of the Internet, servers, applications and user-held
devices is currently geared towards human users, their decisions and data
utilisation, whereas devices perform low-level operations involving informa-
tion delivery and processing. The mentioned advanced device communication
technology requires devices to be able to obtain the necessary information
about each other including their features, capabilities, intentions and owner-
ship. In other words, communications should include semantic information
related to communicating peers.
Unfortunately, currently even a reliable consistent identification of a com-
municating device is not available. Although MAC addresses provide a cer-
tain type of identification, it merely identifies the network interface and thus
is only useful in a local scope and merely for a lifetime of a physical con-
nection. However, a device might have several network interfaces, and use
different or several of them to connect to a certain peer, thus determining
identity of connecting device is complicated.
4.2 Our Approach
In order to solve the mentioned issues and enable global, autonomous and
dynamic interaction among devices, we envisage a need for global identifica-
tion of communicating entities and particularly an IdM mechanism primarily
dedicated for use by devices in an automated manner. As mentioned above,
the identification system should allow devices to learn each other’s identi-
ties, i.e. functionality, capabilities, goals and ownership, perform discovery
of devices and establish customised identity-based connections with selected
devices.
The vision analysed in this chapter, as well as its implementation pre-
sented in Chapter 5, aims at describing a system that utilises capabilities of
IoT to build a platform of recognisable communicating entities, i.e. devices
that are uniquely identified and contain their own identities, similarly to hu-
man users. Furthermore, identification of devices involves information about
their owners. The latter feature enables device authentication that is aware
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of the device’s user, thus enabling automatic, user-oriented applications and
device communications.
In the remainder of the document, we use term M2M to refer to au-
tonomous intelligent communication among devices, without referring to cur-
rent M2M system implementations or ETSI specification.
Although the discussed technology is designed for utilisation by devices,
it is eventually targeted towards enhancing functionality and experience of
human users, e.g. regular consumers that carry one or more intelligent de-
vices with them. Therefore, the system should also involve user-related in-
formation. However, besides including user information in authentication
processes, the IdM system also has to address the following aspects related
to user’s behaviour:
• Device sharing. In many environments, including home and work-
places, there are certain devices that are utilised by different users
at different time. Thus, the devices should be user-aware and allow
services and other peers to get user-related information, which could
afterwards be used for device authorisation or adaptation of communi-
cations.
• Multiple identities. Users may desire or be demanded to use cer-
tain identities in specific environments. For example, ”bring your own
device” policy increasingly used in workplace environments allows em-
ployees to bring their own devices for performing work-related activi-
ties. However, companies may wish to restrict possibilities to perform
tasks not necessary for work, e.g. using social networks. Similarly, a
person might not want to use work-related credentials when he/she is
accessing services from home. Thus, a device should be able to repre-
sent different identities related to the same user that are used in specific
areas. Therefore, there is a need for a mechanism that enables selection
of active identity.
• Multiple devices. A user may be equipped with multiple devices at
a given moment. Before he/she can access a certain service using more
than one device, it is necessary to authenticate the devices. However,
typing in the login credentials in each device is impractical. The system
has to address this issue by providing a mechanism for simplified login
procedure for service access using multiple devices.
The configuration of a system oriented towards a human user is illustrated
in Figure 4.1. Here, user John utilises his set of devices, i.e. a smart phone,
a tablet personal computer (PC) and a laptop PC, to reach multiple services
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available to him. When John wishes to use a certain service, he sets the
devices to provide the service with one of John’s identities that the service
is able to recognise. In the presented figure, any device is used with one or
more of the identities. Furthermore, a given identity allows authenticating
to multiple services, which is indicated in the figure using rounded rectangles
representing association of identities and services.
What is more, another user Michael, working in one or more shared envi-
ronments with John, is allowed to utilise the same devices that John is using,
thus making devices shared and required to know the exact user and his/her
identity.
4.3 Challenges
The aspects of the envisaged IdM system presented above create multiple
challenges. Most of them are related to multiplicity and varying number of
entities as well as dynamic relationships. In this section, we elaborate the list
of challenges in more detail. As mentioned, the technology is intended to en-
hance device-to-device communications needed for advanced user-oriented
applications, thus the challenges presented further reflect actions from a
user’s perspective.
The following are the challenges imposed on the envisaged IdM system:
1. Authentication using a user-related identifier. Although this
document discusses a communication system for users and user-oriented
applications, the system is primarily based on communications among
devices. To enable automatic communications among devices and pro-
viding users with services, devices should be aware of their users and
present their identifiers to other peers for authentication and further
communication.
2. Creation and management of identities. As already mentioned,
a user has multiple identities that he/she wants to use when working
in different environments and accessing various services. The system
should provide a way to create new identities as well as to present them
for services during registration and later authentication. Additionally,
the system should support management of relationships among differ-
ent identities, e.g. user-device relationships.
3. Authentication of multiple devices. This challenge can be treated
as the next step of ”single user, multiple services”, that is currently ap-
proached with SSO feature with SAML, OAuth and other technologies.
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Figure 4.1: Users accessing services using devices configured with multiple
identities
Although in our situation there is still a one user accessing multiple
services, the user utilises multiple devices, potentially simultaneously,
and expects a seamless access to a certain service with all of his/her
devices after the initial authentication, performed on one of his/her de-
vices. Thus, the IdM system has to support convenient authentication
of multiple user’s devices, i.e. a feature we call SDSO.
4. Discovery of identities suitable for authentication. The number
of services accessed by a typical user is continuously growing. This also
infers that the number of identities created by a user for different sets of
services will only increase. Thus, eventually manual discovery of avail-
able services and selection of suitable identity might become practically
infeasible. Identity selection should be performed semi- or fully auto-
matically. Thus, the developed system should provide a mechanism to
discover services, learn about their accepted identities and prompt the
user for identity selection only after the list of identities is minimised
to those that the service accepts.
5. Privacy Protection. Utilisation of the envisioned technology might
cause a threat to user’s privacy. Even more, the imposed threat may
be larger than potential threat caused by classical services, i.e. when
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one identity is used per service. The scale of the threat is influenced
by the following reasons.
First, an identity might be used by multiple services. However, some
identity data fields might be intended for use only by one or several
specific services. Hence, there is a need for identity data access man-
agement mechanism that is aware of services that access identity data.
Second, although a user presents the same identity to multiple services,
usually he/she does not want the services to be able to recognise that
it is the same user. In other words, services should not be able to
communicate to each other and share details about the user, e.g. user’s
behaviour, without explicit user’s consent.
Third, details about the set of user’s devices and each individual device
can reveal additional details threatening user’s privacy. For example,
from a set of devices, the service might be able to predict what the user
intends to do, e.g. work, go on vacation, exercise or other. Although
this information is at first glance innocent, it may be exploited for
malicious intentions. Thus, disclosure of such information has to be
controlled.
6. Utilisation of existing technologies. The problems explained in
this chapter are already present. Therefore, the provided solution is
already needed and thus has to utilise currently available technolo-
gies. However, the system should also enable potential future extension
based on evolution of ICT.
4.4 Envisaged Use Case
This section presents a use case that illustrates a realistic situation of the
system’s utilisation from the user’s perspective.
In our envisaged scenario, a user John has several identities installed
in his devices (a smart phone, a tablet PC and a laptop PC, as shown in
Figure 4.1). He uses these devices to access different services. When John
goes to his friend Michael, he wants to obtain access to the WiFi network of
Michael’s home and access the Internet from his devices.
In the classical scenario, John would ask Michael for the network’s pass-
word. However, typing network password into all of his devices is not prac-
tical. Besides, the password itself can be very complex for security rea-
sons, which increases the rate of errors during authentication. Thankfully,
Michael’s network access is managed from a cloud IdP server which also
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stores John’s identity. The latter identity is specified in Michael’s home net-
work as Michael’s friend, thus the system may provide John’s devices with
access to the network if they can prove that they belong to and are currently
controlled by John. To obtain access to the network, John takes one of his
devices, e.g. his smart phone, selects the identity and performs authentica-
tion. Authentication to the identity requires John to type in his personal user
name and password. When the device is authenticated by the IdP, Michael’s
home network provides access to this device, obtains a list of other John’s
devices that he potentially has at the moment and suggests authenticating
additional devices. John selects additional devices from the list by using
the same smart phone and sends a response back to the server. After this
procedure, the specified John’s personal devices obtain access to the network.
Analogous steps may be performed when John wants to obtain access to
the network of his workplace. He then simply selects a network, authenticates
with his enterprise identity and specifies additional devices to connect.
When going to stay in the hotel, John can use one of his identities, de-
pending on the circumstances of his stay. If it is a personal trip, the stay at
the hotel and access to the hotel’s network is charged directly to John, thus
his personal details, including address, bank account number or a credit card
information are presented to the hotel’s system. If John is staying at the
hotel for business reasons, he might want to provide the hotel’s system with
his enterprise identity. This identity may store bank account number only
for internal use, e.g. for paying salary. Thus, in this case the enterprise IdP
would provide another virtual identity, where John’s bank account number
is replaced by his company’s account number. The further authentication
process matches the one described in the case of authentication to Michael’s
home network.
Chapter 5
IdM System Proposal
This chapter presents the proposed IdM system that addresses future com-
munications based on autonomous devices and geared towards user-oriented
services. Analysis of the system starts with Section 5.1, which presents an
abstract view of the IdM system’s components and entities it involves. After-
wards, Section 5.2 describes the identification mechanism used in the system.
Section 5.3 presents the system’s functionality and responsibilities. Subse-
quently, Section 5.4 presents the system’s static view by focusing on internal
system’s structure. Finally, Section 5.5 analyses the system from dynamic
perspective by presenting system’s actions and operations performed by dif-
ferent components. In order to avoid ambiguity, system’s analysis includes
Universal Modelling Language (UML) diagrams, where applicable.
5.1 System’s Entities
This section describes entities that are distinguished in our IdM system and
directly or indirectly participate in M2M communications. In our system,
these objects are unambiguously identified with identifiers and described with
identities, as it is presented further in Section 5.2. The remainder of this sec-
tion is divided into 2 parts. The first part discusses system’s logical entities,
which define the data involved in the IdM model. The second part addresses
the physical infrastructure and presents physical entities that enable our IdM
system.
5.1.1 Logical Entities
As already mentioned, our proposed IdM system addresses a situation where
multiple potentially shared devices communicate with each other or certain
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services to obtain desired data or functionality provided by certain parties.
Based on this simple definition, we identified the following system’s entities:
1. User: a human user that utilises one or more devices to access services,
such as a social website, WiFi connectivity or advanced context-aware
and AmI-based functionality, e.g. a smart conference room or a smart
payment system in a shopping mall.
2. Device: typically a piece of hardware equipment communicating with
other hardware over a certain connectivity channel in order to obtain
information or a service. In our system, devices are controlled by hu-
man users. However, a single device may be shared, i.e. used by several
users during different time periods. Therefore, decisions of whether to
allow a device to access certain functionality or resources are based on
information about the current user of the device.
3. Domain: an area where a device or a user operates, or, in other
words, an institution that provides the identity and defines its utili-
sation scope. It can be a workplace, a specific service or home envi-
ronment. Together with information about the user and/or device, a
domain provides additional information enabling access-related deci-
sions made on the side of Service Provider. Furthermore, a domain
itself may define specific Service Providers that a user and/or device
can reach, and perform authorisation checks in IdP before forwarding
authorisation to the service. This enables two-step authentication from
both the side of a Domain and a Service Provider.
4. Service Provider: a party that provides services to requesting users
that utilise certain devices.
As described above, system’s entities are related to each other. For ex-
ample, a device, e.g. a smart phone, can be controlled by a certain user.
Furthermore, the device and the user both represent a certain organisation,
i.e. domain. We suggest that this information, specifically user, device and
organisation, is included into consideration when deciding whether this com-
bination is authorised to access requested features in a service. Thus, we
suggest using identifier parts to specify distinct users, devices and domains.
These parts are afterwards combined into a single user-device-domain com-
bination that is an identifier representing a specific user utilising a certain
device and coming from a certain domain. Existence of such an identifier also
means that the domain allows a certain user to utilise a particular device to
access services. This combined identifier, as further specified in Section 5.2,
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is the key-structure that is presented by a device to a service when requesting
access.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, there may be multiple relationships among
users, devices and domains. A single user might contain several devices and
devices may be shared among multiple users. Furthermore, as the mentioned
”bring your own device” policy used in workplaces illustrates, devices can be
utilised in different operational areas, i.e. domains, and utilisation of iden-
tities related to these domains may be restricted based on internal domain
policies. Thus, a single device may have multiple user-device-domain combi-
nations associated with it even for the same human user.
5.1.2 Physical Entities
Our proposed system is a distributed system and follows federated IdM
model. Its infrastructure consists of several physical parts that relate to
logical entities defined above. The following are the physical system’s enti-
ties representing the general view of the systems infrastructure, as presented
in Figure 5.1:
1. Device Subsystem (DS) is a middle-ware layer stored in a user’s
device and providing a set of functionality to Operating System (OS)
and user applications. DS is potentially located in a secure element or
trusted execution environment to prevent unauthorised modification of
data or corruption of valid operations.
2. Service Subsystem (SS) is a part of service infrastructure that en-
ables using the protocol and infrastructure of the proposed system for
authentication of a device and user. Furthermore, this subsystem en-
ables authentication of additional user’s devices, as discussed later in
this chapter. From the perspective of user’s devices, services and there-
fore SSs may be either local or remote, e.g. WiFi connection or a social
website, respectively.
3. Identity Provider Subsystem (IdPS) represents the part of IdP
responsible for storage of all the identity data as well as authentication
of users/devices and services. Unlike SS, IdPS is considered a remote
entity, i.e. not in the location of a device and services (when the latter
do not include IdP functionality). It can be either a private or public
entity, installed by a private user at home or a public party in a cloud,
respectively.
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4. User represents an actor that uses one or more devices to access and
utilise services. In turn, services learn about the user’s identity and
obtain related identity data by communicating with IdP.
IdPS is a new element in device-to-device communications. It may seem
controversial to trust a third party for storing such sensitive data as identities
and authentication secrets, but it is needed in order to provide the following
benefits and solve certain problems, as discussed further.
In the broad sense, IdPS is required for automated communications and
functionality, since an identifier alone is not always sufficient to perform
reliable and effective communications. For example, a communicating service
and a device of a specific domain may decide they can trust each other if 1) the
parties can prove their identities and 2) the service and IdP storing domain’s
identities are connected with a static relationship. However, as mentioned in
Chapter 4, devices should be allowed to dynamically establish connections
when no initial static relationships are defined. Thus, additional information
about entities has to be provided in such a way that it is easily discoverable
and available for devices during authentication and further communication.
These storage, search and discovery features are provided by IdPS.
Storing identity data in a remotely accessible server also enables freeing
devices from having to store identity data in their own memory, which would
be rather space-consuming if a device contains multiple identities. Further-
more, our design enables global entity discovery by specifying certain criteria,
if the IdPs themselves are discoverable. This also enables device mobility, i.e.
changing communication addresses, and multi-homing. Information related
to device addresses and access technologies may be stored in IdPSs as part
of device identities.
Figure 5.1: High-level structure of the system
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Furthermore, as already mentioned, the system’s design is intended to
enable regular home users to create private subsystems of identifiers for pos-
sessed devices and self-established identities, which can then be provided to
local or remote services that trust user’s IdPS, e.g. a friend’s home network.
However, in order to enable remote services to access user’s private IdPS, the
user establishing an IdPS has to obtain a public IP address enabling direct
access to the IdPS. Although technically possible, the current situation in-
dicates that a rather small number of private Internet users have public IP
addresses. Thus, providing IdM functionality as a service in the cloud en-
abling public access seems a more rational choice for private users. However,
we allow a user to establish an IdPS of our system personally for his/her
local services at home, work or other private space.
Additionally, having identities in the cloud improves privacy, as long as
the IdP itself can be trusted. More specifically, our system requires that both
the user and the service are authenticated before the service obtains user’s
identifier and identity information. If the service cannot prove its identity or
it is not trusted by IdP, as well as when it appears that the device is asking
for access to a different service than the one requesting user’s authentication,
the service does not learn the user’s identifier and/or identity data.
Finally, as already mentioned, IdP is intended to be established as a cloud
service and thus provide typical cloud benefits, such as scalable capabilities
of computing and storage, as well as global public access.
The exact functionality, structure and collaboration of subsystems are
discussed more thoroughly in Sections 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, respectively.
As mentioned above, the system is distributed, because the design allows
having multiple IdPSs managed by multiple IdPs. Similarly, there can be
multiple services managing separate SS, as well as multiple users with their
own devices that contain DS. The system enables each component to com-
municate with other system’s components of different types. Thus, SSs are
allowed to communicate with one or more IdPS instances, making the system
a federated IdM system.
5.2 Identification System
As discussed in Section 5.1, the proposed system consists of several com-
municating entities. In order for these entities to discover each other and
obtain the necessary information related to peers, they hold their identifiers
and present them to other parties on demand. This section discusses the
identifiable entities and format of their identifiers. Furthermore, it describes
how the IdM system supports identity data management.
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5.2.1 Requirements for Identification
IdM system presented in this document enables identification of logical en-
tities specified in Section 5.1, which directly or indirectly communicate with
each other. Before specifying structure of identifiers, we analyse the require-
ments imposed on entity identification:
1. It is clear that our identifiable entity set comprises a hierarchical struc-
ture. For example, an IdP holds identity data and provides identifica-
tion of users and devices associated with one or more domains. Fur-
thermore, a domain may contain one or more devices and provide them
with identifiers. Similarly, a domain may involve one or more users, e.g.
employees, who use their company’s devices. Finally, a device may be
used by one or more users. An identification system should reflect these
hierarchical relationships.
2. In order to enable global communication, identifiers have to be globally
discoverable and have consistent and unique meaning across different
domains.
3. An identifier has to include all the necessary information for identifica-
tion of a specific communicating unit. For example, a communicating
user’s identifier should uniquely define the user, device and domain.
Otherwise, if part of this information, e.g. the device identification
part, was stored as part of a user’s identity, obtaining this information
would require additional requests to IdP, which would happen rather
often due to importance of device identification.
4. It is desirable that identification mechanism enables easy access to iden-
tity data related to different identities.
5.2.2 Identification System
In order to meet the requirements specified above, our IdM system con-
tains an a tree-structure of identifiers based on URL format. As dis-
cussed in Section 5.1, a stand-alone identifier represents the combination
of partial identifiers. The universal identifier format follows the scheme
idpID/domIDPart/devIDPart/userIDPart that constitutes a valid
HTTP URL (see Figure 5.2) and contains the following fields:
1. idpID: identifier of an IdP. This is a standalone identifier representing
a valid URL. The idpID part is the authority component, i.e. the
address of an IdP. It is either a symbolic value, i.e. a Fully Qualified
Domain Name (FQDN), or an IP address.
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Figure 5.2: An example identifier used in the system
2. domIDPart: partial identifier of a domain specifying an organisation
or scope where devices and users are registered. This element can be
treated as the root element of an identification hierarchy in a company.
However, domIDPart is a partial identifier, meaning that it needs an
idpID part pre-pending it in order to represent an addressable and
unique identifier. There may be several different domains with the
same domIDPart registered in different IdPs.
3. devIDPart: partial identifier of a device. It is created and assigned
to a device by a certain domain. Typically, this identifier is formatted
accordingly to domain’s regulations. devIDPart is static, i.e. it in-
stalled in a device and does not change if the device is used by different
users identified in the domain. Similarly to domIDPart, devIDPart
is not a standalone identifier and needs to be combined with idpID
and domIDPart to constitute a complete and unique identifier.
4. userIDPart: partial identifier of a user. Together with the previously
mentioned identification components, this identifier uniquely identifies
the user coming from a specific domain that is utilising a device.
As discussed above, identification in our IdM system is based on a family
of identifiers that are made of one or more sub-components, i.e. partial
identifiers. A certain combination of partial identifiers constitutes a complete
identifier that may indicate different entities and contexts, as specified below:
1. Full user-device identifier udevID specifies the user and the ex-
act device that is connecting to a service on user’s behalf. It fol-
lows format idpID/domIDPart/devIDPart/userIDPart. The
devIDPart and userIDPart are both registered in domain identi-
fied by domIDPart, which stores and manages their identity data in
an IdP identified by idpID.
2. IdP identifier idpID, as discussed above, completely and uniquely
identifies and provides location information to IdP in the web. This
sub-component is the only one that can be used as a standalone iden-
tifier in our system.
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3. Domain identifier domID identifies a domain as an entity registered
in an IdP. It follows format idpID/domIDPart.
4. Device identifier devID identifies a device that belongs to domain
domID, which has identities registered in IdP idpID. devID follows
format idpID/domIDPart/devIDPart. It is a user-independent
identifier that merely defines hardware equipment that is related to a
specific domain.
5. User identifier userID identifies a user identity that belongs to do-
main domID and follows format idpID/domID//userID. Unlike the
full format identifier, user identifier lacks the devID part, because it
is not relevant in this structure.
Different identifiers, i.e. combinations of the mentioned identifier sub-
components, are managed with user accounts. In order to start using the
proposed IdM system, with a certain device, a user has to log into the device
with one of his/her accounts, as described in Section 5.5.1. Afterwards,
the device obtains a specific udevID combination to be presented to other
communication parties, e.g. services.
If a different person in the same domain starts using the same device, the
new active udevID differs from the one used by the previous user only by
its userIDPart sub-component. However, if a user (the same or another)
logs into an account that specifies a different domain, the mentioned sub-
components may be different, depending on configuration.
The presented identification system is designed for use by devices in au-
tomatic and dynamic communications. However, in certain situations a user
may be requested to specify his/her user identity or an exact device that is
going to be used. For example, during user login in a device, he/she needs
to provide user identifier, specified in userID format, as described above.
However, URL-based identification in user level may seem too complex for
regular users. Remembering different sub-components of an identifier, typ-
ing them in a correct sequence and remembering the differences of identifiers,
e.g. udevID, devID and userID, is error prone and may lead to rejection
of the technology.
To improve user experience, we introduce certain simplifications. First
of all, it is worth noting that during login procedure, the user does not use
udevID to specify user identity. udevID is composed after authentication,
based on selected devID and userID and is processed only by lower-level
components, e.g. DS and SS. Therefore, its complexity does not influence
user’s experience. Second, devIDs are bound to certain domains and in-
stalled before their utilisation. In addition to that, the system may restrict
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that a particular device may contain at most one devID issued by a certain
domain. In this case, the userID can be simplified to userIDPart@domID
format, which follows the structure of an email address that is familiar to the
majority of Internet users. This identifier is used locally at user’s level and
is transformed to complete userID and back by DS to send in the network
and vice versa. We can reduce user’s effort even more by creating a rule
that domIDPart is globally unique, regardless of IdP, with identity claimed
using certificates, e.g. X.509. In this case, userID may be simplified to
userIDPart@domIDPart, i.e. excluding idpID.
Additionally, a higher-layer software may be used to control user’s lo-
cal account and improve user experience. For example, such software may
prepend userIDPart typed in by the user with one of devIDs associated
with user’s account in the device.
5.2.3 Identity Information
The identification scheme discussed above allows uniquely identifying IdP,
domain, device and a user. A change of at least one of the components in the
identifier results in an identifier that potentially refers to a different identity
with different properties. This identity information has to be available for
access by other entities before they establish connections. However, as ex-
plained above, multiple combinations of components lead to a rather large set
of identities in each device, and keeping the identity information in a device
itself might be impossible or complicated due to memory limits of a device.
Furthermore, polling devices in order to decide if certain application-based
communication can be performed drains its already limited energy resources
and is especially complicated in a system involving billions of devices.
The IdM system proposed in this thesis solves the mentioned problem by
storing identity information in an IdP and enabling identity’s global address-
ing with an identifier that follows a URL format, as specified in Section 5.2.2.
Such an identification mechanism enables various parties to access identity
data based on the identifier, which might be directly requested from a com-
municating entity or found in an IdP by performing discovery. For example,
identity information located using devID or udevID contains information
about an entity’s PoCs, physical location, peers that are communicating with
the entity and other information. Just like information in the World-Wide
Web, identity data in our system is composed by linking data from different
entities, e.g. domain, user and one or more devices.
Although entity identification is based on URL structure, it does not
strictly define the application-level protocol that is used, e.g. HTTP. This
is because communicating parties may have different capabilities for pars-
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ing data and even for obtaining it. Therefore, a given IdP may support
several protocols for providing data, including Hypertext Markup Language
(HTML) document, a text file obtained using File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
or other. Furthermore, the data may be provided in XML or JavaScript
Object Notation (JSON) format. However, specific information stored in an
IdP as well as its storage and delivery formats exceed the scope of this thesis.
5.3 System’s Functionality
This section discusses the proposed IdM system’s functions and involved
parties. The system’s functions are specified in a use case diagram presented
in Figure 5.3. As the diagram shows, the system involves three types of
actors, i.e. roles, and three distinct subsystems responsible for performing
certain use cases.
The subsystems provide specific sets of functionality and are utilised by
different actors. A User utilises the DS installed in his/her device to log
into a certain user identity and access services available directly to the user
or indirectly, through lower-level utilities provided for the device, based on
this user identity. The second subsystem, IdPS, stores identity data related
to participating entities, i.e. domains, users and devices, thus enabling easy
discovery and communication of devices, authentication of users, devices and
services as well as management of device access to these services. Identity
data stored in IdPS is managed by one or more Identity Managers. It
is important to note that Identity Manager is not the same as an iden-
tity provider. The latter provides the infrastructure for managing identities,
whereas the former acts as an administrator related to a certain domain and
uses the infrastructure. Finally, SS, which is a part of a service compatible
with our system, manages access rights of identities and performs authori-
sation. Service access rights depend on the identity information it obtains
from an IdPS. Their management may be based on additional access control
mechanisms, such as those discussed in Section 2.1.4. Access rules managed
by both Identity Manager and Service Provider enable controlling
access to services from two points, i.e. IdPS and SS. This aspect is discussed
more thoroughly below.
Before analysing use cases in detail, it is needed to explain several aspects
of the diagram. First, although the diagram involves three distinct actors,
a certain party may be responsible for more than one of these actor roles.
For example, a university may provide and manage both the IdPS and ser-
vices that utilise this IdM system. Similarly, a user himself may establish
an IdPS and store as well as manage his/her identities privately. This in-
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formation may be provided in requests to access certain services that trust
the provider, e.g. a friend’s home network. Furthermore, although the sys-
tem includes multiple use cases, some of them are not specifically defined
in this document, because they can be implemented in many different ways
that are platform- or application-dependent. Nevertheless, these use cases
are included in our vision of the IdM system’s capabilities and responsibil-
ities. Although we provide implementation examples for certain use cases,
the exact implementation details are beyond the scope of this document and
need further definition.
The remainder of this section discusses each of the use cases in more
detail. We start with use cases in DS.
Use case ”Login to Identity” enables a User to set an active identity in
his/her device. Based on the active identity, the device presents a certain
identifier to services for authentication and afterwards service access. This
thesis does not specifically define how a User provides credentials for lo-
gin process in a device. In the most typical case, the User knows his/her
user name and password combinations for each of the identities he/she uses
and inputs a specific combination during login. Alternatively, biometric, be-
havioural or some other password-related technology may be used for user
recognition, although a user would still need to specify the userID for se-
lection of a specific identity. Based on user-specified login information, DS
sets an active identity identified by a certain udevID.
When a User does not wish to utilise the identity that is currently ac-
tive in a device, he/she performs the action specified by use case ”Logout
from Identity”, which is typically performed by pressing a button in device’s
menu, executed automatically by the device after an inactivity period or
using another technique. If a User logs out of an identity in a device, a cor-
responding DS unit has no active identity set and thus cannot operate with
other system’s components until a certain identity is set again by performing
the login procedure.
Another use case performing actions with active identities is ”Switch Iden-
tity”. This use case is performed when there is a need to change identity to
a suitable or desirable one, typically when SS requires an identity issued and
managed by a specific IdPS. Similarly to virtual identities specified in [31],
in our system a User may have multiple identities that represent different,
potentially overlapping attribute sets. Thus, when switching into a specific
identity in a device, a User has to perform the full login procedure as spec-
ified for use case ”Login to Identity”, including provision of credentials or
certain secret information. Optionally, if there is another identity currently
set as active, a logout procedure is performed before login procedure is al-
lowed.
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One of the most important use cases of the system is ”Connect to a Ser-
vice”. This use case enables manual connection to a service with a user’s
device. However, this use case may be extended with additional steps de-
fined by use case ”Connect to Service with Additional Devices”. This use
case enables SDSO functionality and allows a User to connect other devices
he/she is currently using to the same service using the same identity but
without the need to type the full credentials in each of the devices. Actions
that enable this functionality on the side of IdPS are defined in use case
”Connect Additional Devices”.
Functionality of the mentioned connection to a service procedure is based
on several key-aspects. First, it ensures service access provision based on the
presented User’s identity, i.e. access is granted to the User, regardless
the device he/she uses, rather than a secret that is related to the service
itself, e.g. a pass-phrase used in WiFi with Pre-Shared Key (PSK) security
mode. Furthermore, devices are able to use this authentication scheme to
access both local and remote services. For example, a device may access a
traditional WiFi network that uses EAP-TLS authentication technique, or
a remote service, e.g. a synchronisation service or storage of measurements
of environmental conditions. Finally, although based on identity related to
the User, authentication is provided both to the user and to his/her one
or multiple devices. It means that a device may still perform its own inde-
pendent functions that are not directly related to User, but utilise his/her
identity to obtain access to establish connections to services or other devices.
Connection-related use cases are thoroughly analysed later in this chapter.
Use cases related to identity creation and modification are performed by
an Identity Manager and involve actions in DS and IdPS. User, device
and domain identities are created by performing ”Create Identity in Server”.
This use case also includes input of identity information that is afterwards
stored in IdPS. For user identities, identity data also includes user’s creden-
tials needed for logging into one or more devices. However, to actually log
into a user identity in a device, the latter has to be configured to support the
identity. Thus, some additional information has to be installed in the device,
including security data for communication with the corresponding IdPS and
domain. As explained below, this information defines a device identity in an
exact device. The latter information is stored by performing ”Store Iden-
tity in Device” use case. Actions performed during creation of identities are
thoroughly described in Section 5.5.3.
Similarly, a device may be considered not suitable any more for logging
in with user identities from a certain domain. In this case, a device iden-
tity related to the corresponding domain may be deleted by a performing a
procedure defined as ”Delete Identity From Device”. The corresponding de-
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vice information is also deleted from the server that stores it with a use case
”Delete Identity from Server”. Similarly, this use case also enables deleting
user and domain identities.
In addition to previously defined identity creation and deletion use cases,
IdPS contains one more management use case ”Manage Identity Data in
Server”. This operation enables administering data related to user, device or
domain entities, to preserve its validity, up to date status and avoid violation
of security precautions, e.g. keeping only the minimal data set necessary
for intended operations. Depending on IdPS implementation specifics, this
use case may be performed either by an Identity Manager working as
a centralised management authority or the user himself. A User might be
allowed to perform this use case only from a personal device by logging into
it using the corresponding identity first. Alternatively, IdPS might provide
a website accessible from anywhere, thus a user could use any device with
a web browser to perform management. However, this option still requires
the User to prove his/her identity by providing login credentials in the web
page. Further specifics of the use case exceed the scope of this document and
remain for definition during implementation.
The final category of use cases involves IdPS and SS operations related
to user/device authorisation and connection establishment. First, ”Manage
Access Rights” in SS describes all the activities related to specifying rules for
making authorisation decisions based on identity data obtained from IdPS.
The access rules are implementation-specific and thus beyond the scope of
this document. Furthermore, as already mentioned, both IdPS and SS in-
volve operations related to checking user’s identity. More specifically, IdPS
is responsible for authenticating user’s device and the service he/she is try-
ing to access. Therefore, use case ”Authenticate Device” checks if identity
presented by a device really represents the current user. Authentication is
performed based on login credentials provided by the user earlier or during
connection to the service. Additionally, ”Authenticate Service” checks if the
service contacting the IdPS is what it claims to be and it actually is the one
that the device is trying to access. Finally, when IdPS confirms validity of
a user’s identity to the specified service and optionally provides the service
with additional identity data, a SS is able to check if the user utilising a
particular device is authorised to perform any actions with a service. This
procedure is indicated by use case ”Check Authorisation”, which is a part of
broader use case ”Accept Device Connection” that defines the sequence of
messages required for connection establishment and sent between the service
and user’s device.
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5.4 System’s Structure
This section describes the static structure of the proposed IdM system, in-
cluding its members and their relationships. The description includes a more
thorough analysis of system’s physical entities presented in Section 5.1. For
clarity reasons, some of the information from earlier sections is also repeated
in this section. The static system’s structure represented in a UML class
diagram format is shown in Figure 5.4. This diagram is closely related to
previously discussed use cases and identification system.
The system consists of several main components. The DS, SS and IdPS
represent the already described components of the IdM system. The actor
User, introduced in Section 5.3, is also presented in the structure as one of
the components involved in the system. This actor differs from other actors,
since he/she has or remembers certain information, i.e. credentials required
to login to his/her identities on a device. Other actors merely act as entities
taking management decisions. They do not play a role in the system’s static
model and are not included in the class diagram.
As explained in Section 5.1, the system is distributed and federated, thus
many-to-many relationships are possible among different subsystems, as it is
reflected in the class diagram. The remainder of this section analyses each
of the components more thoroughly.
DS represents the system’s side related to a user’s device. As the dia-
gram shows, each device contains an IdentityAgent designed to work as
a middle-ware IdM layer and provide authentication-related functionality to
underlying OS as well as higher-level subsystems, e.g. third-party applica-
tions. DS stores installed device identities, i.e. identifiers along with security
tokens for secure connection with corresponding IdPs and domains, as well
as tracks the currently active user identifier.
The Application class included in DS is not directly provided by our
system. The class is included in the diagram only to specify that applica-
tions utilising the system are required to be aware of it and developed using
provided API. More specifically, applications have to be capable of invoking
connection process by utilising capabilities of system’s IdentityAgent and
know identifiers of services they want to access. Other application features
are implementation-dependent, thus Application class is defined abstract
in the diagram.
IdPS acts as an independent subsystem that stores identity data for dif-
ferent users, devices and domains, as well as itself. This information is kept
in memory using IDData and its children classes. Furthermore, IdPS stores
relationships among these identities for more complex identity data usage
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scenarios. Finally, the subsystem uses class UserIDData to store creden-
tials associated with user accounts related to user identities. IdPS is typically
stored remotely in the cloud and is globally accessible. However, indepen-
dent private IdPSs used with private services are also allowed. It is important
to note that although multiple IdPSs are allowed, any collaboration among
them is beyond the scope of this document.
IdPS collaborates with SSs located together with services by providing
them with requested identity data. Only trusted services that have pre-signed
contracts with IdP are allowed to obtain data from its IdPS. However, we
do not specify this trust mechanism and leave it to be defined during imple-
mentation. One of the possibilities to manage the trusted service providers
is to store a list of pairs containing a service identifier and a pair-wise secret
at the IdP. This secret could then be used to perform a Diffie-Hellman key
exchange to establish a secure channel between SS and IdPS.
Furthermore, IdPS communicates with devices of multiple users in order
to allow them to log into their identities. Trust among IdP and devices is
ensured by using information in devices that is installed as part of device
identities, as mentioned in Section 5.3. Specifically, device identities include
security information for communication with IdPSs and domains that issued
these identities. Specific implementation for this security information is be-
yond the scope of this document. Implementation options include, but are
not limited to, X.509 certificates, secret for Diffie-Hellman key exchange or
a pre-shared token. These options determine the specifics of data structures
in communicating DS and IdPS.
Finally, SS is a component that is deployed together with the service and
performs authorisation of a user’s device based on identity data related to a
user and his/her device (identified by udevID). As mentioned in Section 5.1,
the proposed IdM solution targets services accessible by a device both locally,
such as WiFi connectivity service, and remotely, e.g. a social network or a
cloud data storage service. Thus, depending on a specific service, a certain
SS can also be treated as local or remote.
5.5 System’s Actions
Previous sections of this chapter described the proposed IdM system’s static
features. This section continues the description of the system by analysing it
from dynamic perspective, i.e. presenting its actions. Among other features,
this section discusses an innovative SDSO feature that enables users to obtain
access to a service from multiple devices by performing full authentication
on only one of the devices. Analysis of the dynamic features starts with dis-
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cussion of the basic authentication principles in Section 5.5.1. Afterwards,
Section 5.5.2 describes collaboration among different system’s components
during device authentication and connection to a service establishment. Fi-
nally, Section 5.5.3 thoroughly describes system’s management actions and
particularly focuses on creation of identity data in the IdM infrastructure.
5.5.1 User Login and Device Authentication
The proposed system enhances autonomous device-to-device communications
based on the information about users utilising them at particular moments.
To learn and use information about the current user, the system involves two
authentication stages: user login in a device and device authentication to
other communicating devices, e.g. services. As already explained in Section
5.2, user and device identifiers are related, thus a particular user’s identity
that is specified during user login also determines the full identifier udevID
that a device provides to other peers.
In order for a user to start utilising services connected to the system’s
infrastructure, he/she has to log into the device by providing the latter with
credentials that a device can use when communicating to other parties. The
IdM system is designed for on-line communications with connection to an
IdP available when needed. Thus, a device authenticates a user on-line, i.e.
by communicating with an IdP responsible for the identity a user provides.
However, when logging into a device, a user may use a certain userID only
if the device contains an identifier devID that belongs to the same domain.
As discussed in Section 5.5.3, device identity installation process is performed
by a responsible administrator or the user himself, depending on whether the
IdP is public or private.
It is important to emphasize that user login procedure is typically per-
formed when requesting access to a service. A user may then be requested to
select an identity and provide login credentials. Typically, a user’s account
is protected with a user name and password combination, thus a user has to
type in his/her credentials in order to authenticate. However, when a user
logs into a device, the user identity is set as active and its credentials are
cached for later use when connecting to other services that accept identities
from the same domain.
Device authentication differs from user login procedure, because in this
case it is the device that provides identifier (udevID) to other parties and the
user is not involved. Furthermore, device authentication may be performed
multiple times during a single connection, e.g. when performing security-
critical functions. To prove identity, a device needs to provide its own secret,
or show knowledge of it, and also include authentication data of a user.
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For the device secret, we propose using Identity-Based Cryptography
(IBC), which enables secure identity verification without a need for pub-
lic key management, because an already publicly available identifier, e.g. an
email address, may be used. In our case, system’s identifiers, e.g. udevID
and devID, may serve as public identifiers. Furthermore, communicating
IdPS and DS may both store a shared secret used for authentication and
verification of device identity part. The user’s credentials may additionally
be transferred from device to the IdP, when requested, by protecting them
using the same shared secret.
5.5.2 Connection to a Service
The major attention of our system is focused on a device authentication
mechanism that enables controlling access to services based on information
about devices and their current users. The proposed system involves two
related procedures for establishing a connection to a service: general connec-
tion and authentication. The latter is part of general connection procedure,
but for simplicity and clarity reasons it is distinguished and analysed sepa-
rately. The further description thoroughly analyses various aspects related to
connection to a service and subsystem collaboration during connection estab-
lishment. From the perspective of SDSO feature, we initially discuss actions
performed by the first device connecting to a service and controlled manually
by the user. Afterwards, we discuss automatic connection of additional user’s
devices.
5.5.2.1 General Connection Procedure
General connection to a service ensures that during successfully performed
procedure, a connecting device finds a service, learns about IdPs supported
by the service, authenticates to the service using device and user identity
data, and eventually obtains a service connection that it may use to utilise
the service. Collaboration of different parties during the general connection
procedure is presented as a sequence diagram in Figure 5.5. Due to clarity
reasons, we separate description of complex authentication procedure from
general connection steps. Thus, this explanation focuses on connection pro-
cedure, whereas authentication is analysed separately below. Furthermore,
although the overall connection procedure also involves SDSO-related steps,
they are discussed individually after description of manual connection and
authentication procedures.
Figure 5.5 illustrates a situation when a human user utilises a device and
instructs a certain application to connect to a locally or remotely available
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Figure 5.5: Sequence diagram of general connection procedure
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service that is pre-defined in the application or dynamically discovered. Al-
ternatively, an application may not depend on user’s requests for connection
and connect to a certain service automatically. The latter option is often
suitable for pre-defined, i.e. known by application beforehand, or local ser-
vices.
Afterwards, the application contacts IdentityAgent installed in
the same device with a request for connection to a service specified by
serviceID or alternatively other service contact information. Based on
the mentioned service information, IdentityAgent finds and communi-
cates with the service’s ServiceManager to learn about relationships be-
tween the service and different IdPs and information about requested identity
fields.
When IdentityAgent obtains the service-related information, it uses
the list of IdPs associated with the service to check whether device’s
active identity, if any is set, is suitable for the service. Afterwards,
IdentityAgent informs the user about the service and identity data fields
it requests, as well as potentially prompts the user to switch to another
identity based on specific requirements.
The optional login procedure shows two alternatives. The first one, i.e.
manual connection, is performed when the connecting device is manually
controlled by the user and is the first user’s device accessing the service. The
second optional procedure, automatic connection, enables easily connecting
additional user’s devices after a user performs manual connection with one
of them, as explained in the scenario above. Since automatic connection is
explained below, we exclude it from this description and currently focus on
manual connection.
After login, the new identity is set as the active identity. However, the
credentials are not yet checked by the device or IdP. They are used in authen-
tication procedure performed as the next step of the sequence. In this step,
these credentials are sent to an IdP in Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)-manner, as explained in the description of authentication procedure
below.
When the authentication procedure is complete, IdentityAgent sends
a sessionToken obtained from IdentityProverManager during au-
thentication back to the application, which uses the token for further com-
munication with the service without involving the IdentityAgent.
5.5.2.2 Authentication Procedure
The authentication sequence executed during connection to a service is pre-
sented in Figure 5.6. As mentioned above, this sequence is not performed
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independently, but instead is a part of general connection procedure pre-
sented in Figure 5.5. Although for simplicity this procedure is called an
authentication procedure, it also includes potential authorisation steps to
check user’s validity to use a service.
In the broad sense, procedure of authentication to a service resembles
EAP-based authentication performed when connecting to a wireless network.
As shown in Figure 5.6, the procedure begins when an IdentityAgent lo-
cated in an authenticating device contacts a ServiceManager in a selected
service. However, unlike in EAP, the IdentityAgent also informs the ser-
vice either about its active udevID or just idpID. Provision of a certain
identifier is necessary, because a service may have relationships with multiple
IdPs and thus could not independently determine the IdP needed to contact
for authentication of a device.
An option to initially provide the service with idpID instead of full
udevID enables preserving security and potentially anonymity, because an
IdP may hence hide the real identity of the user and/or device. In such a
scenario, the service obtains the complete udevID of a connecting device
only after a corresponding IdP verifies the service’s identity and that the
latter matches the service that a device intends to access, as described in
later steps of this procedure.
The IdP may also analyse data records stored by an Identity
Manager to check if the user, device or their combination is allowed to
use the particular service. This evaluation is performed together with veri-
fication of user’s and service’s identities. If connection to the service is not
allowed, authentication procedure fails.
After receiving the connection request message, ServiceManager anal-
yses the included identifier (udevID or idpID) and contacts a corre-
sponding IdP’s IdentityProviderManager to authenticate the device.
In order to perform authentication, IdentityProviderManager re-
quests the device’s IdentityAgent for certain identity-related informa-
tion, e.g. credentials. These requests from IdentityProviderManager
to IdentityAgent and responses transmitted in the opposite direction
are transferred among the parties directly or indirectly, i.e. forwarded by
ServiceManager. The exact identity information, credentials, methods
for their protection and transfer techniques depend on implementation. One
of the examples to perform the procedure is to use:
• EAP-TLS between the device and the IdP,
• EAPOL between the device and the service endpoint,
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Figure 5.6: Sequence diagram of authentication procedure
• Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) between the
service and IdP.
In this step, IdentityProviderManager may also request
ServiceManager to prove its identity and check if the service requested
by the device matches the service requesting device authentication. After
IdentityProviderManager validates identity of the device, it returns
the IdP authentication result back to ServiceManager. This result in-
cludes identifier udevID.
The diagram also includes an optionally performed fragment that enables
setting an active identity in IdentityAgent. However, this action is not
performed in the first device that is connected to a service. This fragment,
as well as other SDSO-related deviations from actions performed by first
connecting device, is presented in the description of automatic connection
below.
When ServiceManager receives a proof of device’s identity, it performs
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its own procedure of device authorisation based on device’s udevID and ad-
ditional parameters received from IdentityProviderManager. At this
point, ServiceManager may also request IdentityProviderManager
for additional information related to identity of udevID. The further au-
thorisation mechanism, depending on implementation and specifics of the
service, may include RBAC, access matrix or other access control models.
If authorisation succeeds, ServiceManager requests Identity-
ProviderManager to connect the authenticated device to the service and
provides additional service data that needs to be sent to the device. DS may
perform additional actions with this data, if needed.
Afterwards, IdentityProviderManager enables communication
among the service and device by presenting the necessary data to both par-
ties. In this step, the ServiceManager obtains security parameters for se-
cure communication with the device, based on service data presented to the
IdPS and udevID of the device. Similarly, device obtains a sessionToken
that includes the necessary information related to device and service authen-
tication, identity data accessed by the service as well as security information
for communication with the service. As mentioned above, this token is af-
terwards returned to the requesting application.
5.5.2.3 Connection of Additional Devices
The presented IdM system focuses on a situation when a user utilises mul-
tiple devices and many or all of them have to be connected to a specified
service. Connecting each of the devices by following the manual connection
and authentication procedure specified above would be cumbersome and im-
practical. Thus, the proposed IdM system includes a SDSO feature for seam-
less automatic connection of additional devices after one of the user’s devices
is connected manually by performing manual connection procedure. SDSO
ensures that after this procedure is complete, other devices that a user picks
for utilisation do not require the user to perform the full authentication and
obtain service access in a simplified way.
In the description of this procedure, we refer to the first connected device
that a user utilises to perform manual connection as initial device. Other
devices that obtain access to a service by performing a simplified automatic
connection are called additional devices. It is also important to note that,
just like the initial device, additional devices are connected only after a user
initiates connection, e.g. by launching an application. This feature enables
avoiding overhead due to authentication and connection of devices that, al-
though specified, are never used to access a service.
Automatic connection procedure is enabled by additional connection
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records stored in ConnMsg class objects in DS and managed by Identity-
ProviderManager (see Figure 5.4). The procedure involves both general
connection and authentication sequences specified in Figure 5.5 and Fig-
ure 5.6, respectively. However, the performed steps are different than ex-
plained above. The further description analyses the differences and addi-
tional actions included in automatic connection procedure.
As shown in the lower part of Figure 5.5, connection procedure involves
additional steps necessary for connection of additional devices to the ser-
vice, after the initial device is successfully authenticated and connected.
These steps define that at the end of successful connection to a service,
IdentityAgent asks the user if he/she desires to use the service with
additional devices (displayed as an invocation of requestAdditional-
DevicesOption method). A user may then agree to use additional devices
and merely specify a secret that is used to derive an authToken. This to-
ken is used later during connection of additional devices, as specified below.
The secret may be also obtained in ways other than requesting a textual
code from a user. For example, the secret might be obtained from a user’s
personal UICC card inserted in a device.
Afterwards, IdentityAgent sends the derived authToken and
sessionToken to IdentityProviderManager, which creates a
ConnMsg structure that enables simplified connection of other user’s de-
vices. IdentityProviderManager stores this data for a limited time
period.
During connection of an additional device, a user switches to a de-
vice different than the one used when performing authentication manually.
Furthermore, he/she desires to use the same identity to access the same
service. Thus, he/she again performs connection and authentication pro-
cedures specified above, but this time certain actions are performed dif-
ferently. Specifically, during user login step of the connection procedure,
the automatic connection alternative is performed. In this case, rather
than providing full udevID and authentication credentials, a user sim-
ply specifies a devID or domID, as discussed above, and a secret. This
data is afterwards used in authentication procedure (see Figure 5.6) in the
loop of request and response messages sent between IdentityAgent and
IdentityProviderManager. In this case, after receiving an authentica-
tion request from a ServiceProvider, IdentityProviderManager
requests IdentityAgent of a device to provide a devID and performs
checkAdditionalDevices method to check if it is storing any ConnMsg
structures that are associated with users allowed to utilise this device. Upon
a hit, it sends the device a request for an authToken, which is obtained
by using an analogous secret in the same way as it was obtained in
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the initial user’s device. After successful authentication using a secret,
IdentityProviderManager sends the device udevID and potentially
credentials that the device can use for manual access to other devices. Other
device and service authentication steps performed in the EAP-like request-
response message sequence that are not related to SDSO are also performed
during this automatic authentication alternative.
After the request-response sequence is performed, the device possesses
the authenticated user’s identifier and credentials, thus it may use them to
set the current identity. Further authentication and connection steps are the
same as in manual connection performed in the initial device.
In the case of additional device connection, the user is not requested if
he/she wishes to use the service with additional devices. If there are multiple
additional devices, this procedure is performed separately in each of them,
when they are picked up by the user to access the service.
This procedure shows that actions of ServiceManager do not depend
on the specific connection procedure, i.e. manual or automatic. The men-
tioned aspect is enabled by storing all the sensitive data and critical func-
tionality in centralised and trusted IdPs. This feature simplifies creation
and complexity of services and reduces risks related to insecure or distrusted
services misusing secret data.
5.5.3 System’s Management Operations
The last dynamic aspect addressed in this thesis is establishment of the
system, i.e. the process of IdPS deployment, configuration of relationships
and creation of domain, device and user identities.
As already mentioned, IdPS may be installed locally by a private user or
an enterprise for internal use, i.e. for access by local services. However, the
general intention is to provide the system as a public cloud service. This doc-
ument does not specify exact IdPS implementation or deployment specifics,
but the system must communicate using the defined protocol and have a
reachable IP address or FQDN that can be used as idpID.
When a user or an organisation wishes to utilise a certain IdP for manage-
ment of device and user identities, it first creates a domain, i.e. registers for
IdM service and obtains a domID. This operation is performed by a user or
a responsible administrator of a company, acting as Identity Manager
actor presented in Section 5.3. During domain registration, IdP creates an
administrator account associated with the created domID. This account may
represent one of the user identities identified with a distinct userID defined
in the domain. Depending on implementation, IdP may allow creating ad-
ditional user accounts with administrator rights in the same domain during
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or after the procedure of domain registration. An IdP must ensure that do-
mains are isolated, i.e. management operations and data access policies are
controlled only by domain-related administrators.
In the proposed system, a domain created in an IdP is also issued an iden-
tity. Thus, other parties may request additional domain-related information,
which is managed by Identity Managers. In the most limited case, a
domain is associated with information about its users and devices, which is
required for search and discovery of potential communication peers.
After a domain is created, it is possible to create identities for users and
devices associated to the domain. As already mentioned, identifiers of such
new identities would include domID representing the domain, and therefore
address of IdP.
Creating a user identity is a simple procedure that is performed by an
Identity Manager and involves typical account creation steps present
in other identity-based systems. However, in our system, user identity is
associated with an identifier userID representing a hierarchical structure.
The userIDPart is domain-specific, i.e. Identity Manager may specify
it explicitly or create a rule, e.g. that an identifier should consist of person’s
name, surname and birth year. Additional user identity information may
be provided and managed by Identity Manager or the actual user, by
connecting to the same system using his/her credentials. These credentials
are created as part of the user identity and used to prove user’s presence when
logging into a device or into the IdP website for management of his/her data.
The type of user’s credentials is implementation-specific and depends on
security requirements as well as infrastructure of services that use this data.
Similarly, distribution of user’s credentials also depends on implementation
and type of operations performed by domain. The simplest and most com-
mon type of credentials is a username and password combination, which can
be sent to a user using e-mail, or distributed as a printed copy by an identity
management office. However, the system may use biometric user’s informa-
tion for identification, in which case users provide data before user identities
are created or enabled for access.
Creation of device identity involves two steps:
1. creation of identity in the IdP server, which is similar to creation of
user identity,
2. deployment of device identifier devID along with other related security
data in the actual device.
During device identity creation, an Identity Manager creates a cer-
tain device-related data structure that is stored in the server and potentially
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used for device discovery as well as establishment of a connection with the
latter. Identity Manager may manually enter this data in the server.
However, a more convenient approach is to have the DS itself store most of
the necessary device-related information, e.g. device type, and provide this
information to the server when the device is directly connected to it. Direct
connection during device identity creation also enables performing both of
the mentioned identity creation steps, i.e. creating an identity structure in
the server and storing devID and related data in the device, to be performed
at the same time.
The data set deployed in the device is used by the latter to prove its iden-
tity when connecting to services and IdP servers. Effectively, the second step
of device identity creation defines permission for users to log into the device
using a userID that belongs to the same domain as the installed devID.
Similarly to userID, devID may be defined manually by an Identity
Manager or generated by IdP using a specified rule.
Similarly to domain isolation, device identity structures stored in a device
must be separated and protected from modification by unintended parties,
as well as malicious or careless users. Thus, rights for data modification in a
device must be protected with another secret, e.g. a password or an UICC
card. Alternatively, similarly to identity creation, device data modification
may require connecting a corresponding device to a specific IdP in order to
perform and synchronise changes in both IdP and the device.
Chapter 6
Discussion
This chapter discusses and evaluates the proposed IdM system described in
Chapter 5. It analyses the system’s features, identifies its weaknesses and
aspects that need further investigation. In addition to that, it proposes avail-
able options to solve certain challenges that were not addressed in the thesis.
Along with the thesis outcome, i.e. the proposal of an IdM system, this
chapter addresses the thesis work process itself by identifying and discussing
findings related to this work. The analysis begins in Section 6.1, which com-
pares our system to other IdM systems presented in Chapter 3. Section 6.2
evaluates the system based on 7 identity laws proposed by Cameron [11].
Section 6.3 analyses some of the system’s characteristics related to trust,
usability and anonymity. Finally, Section 6.4 discusses the most important
issues related to practical implementation and usage issues related to the
proposed system.
6.1 System’s Comparison to Other Solutions
This section compares the proposed system to other systems discussed in
Chapter 3. As in the mentioned chapter, here we address device-based and
user-based IdM systems separately. The provided comparison shows that
even though differences exist, the systems share certain similarities. This
means that although the proposed system is designed to serve a different
purpose than other analysed systems, it depends on these technologies and
is built using their strong points.
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6.1.1 Device-Based Systems
Object Identifier The most similar aspect of OID and our system is iden-
tification system. OID uses URIs resolvable by DNS servers, whereas our sys-
tem utilises resolvable URLs, which effectively comprise a subset of URI set
[6]. However, our system’s identification system is much more complex, defin-
ing different members that are involved and enabling identifier distinction by
different contexts. Furthermore, our system is targeted towards user equip-
ment, i.e. intelligent devices, whereas OID utilises additional equipment, e.g.
RFID tags, and thus enables identification and acquisition of data based on
any kind of items, regardless of their intelligence, if any, and communica-
tion capabilities. In addition to that, unlike OID, which enables temporary
identification of an item and thus promotes reuse of identifiers for different
items, our system considers an identifier closely associated with a device,
thus identifier reuse is not intended. Finally, whereas OID merely enables
identification and data acquisition, our system’s functionality is much more
complex, involves authentication, sophisticated identity data management,
discovery of devices and enables utilisation of enhanced security mechanisms.
Cooltown Similarly to OID, Cooltown uses IR and RFID to identify items,
thus unlike our system, it enables providing data and functionality related to
identified things regardless of their computing or communication capabilities.
On one hand, this aspect of Cooltown enables identification of users, devices
and places, which is similar to entities identified in our system. On the other
hand, unlike Cooltown, our system defines a structured approach of entity
identification.
Object Naming Service Unlike ONS, our system enables both discovery
of identity data storage and acquisition of this data. Furthermore, in con-
trast to device meta-data management technologies, our system is focused
on human user and his/her devices regardless of technology used. Finally,
our system defines the format of identifiers as well as procedures of identity
and identifier creation and entity authentication, which is beyond the scope
of ONS.
6.1.2 User-based Systems
Before addressing user-based systems individually, it is worth discussing the
common differences between these systems and our proposal. First, unlike
other systems, our system involves both user and device identities. Second,
it introduces an additional party, identity manager, which is different from
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identity provider and performs IdM in an IdP’s server. Third, whereas other
mentioned systems typically involve independent third-party applications to
transmit messages, our system includes a native, shared and dedicated com-
ponent DS, which is installed in user’s device. Finally, our system serves a
wider purpose, i.e. not only IdM, but also discovery, thus unlike other ser-
vices, it enables search of devices and users, based on defined policies. Other
aspects depend on particular systems, as specified below.
OpenID Compared to OpenID, our system uses a similar approach for ac-
cessing services with identities that are provided by multiple different IdPs.
However, services involved in our system are not limited to web-services and
web-applications that are accessible only by using web browsers. Further-
more, unlike OpenID, our system includes a communication precondition for
a relationship established between collaborating SP and IdP. This relation-
ship also defines data used by SP and terms of its storage and usage. Just
like OpenID, our system uses resolvable URLs to specify identifiers. OpenID
v2 also allows using XRI. However, due to criticism regarding this identi-
fication scheme in comparison to URLs [7], we omit utilisation of XRIs in
our system. Finally, OpenID enables a user to select one of the identities
stored in an OIdP. This is possible if the user provides OIdP identifier in the
service login form. This is similar to our system’s approach, where an IdP
may store multiple identities of the same user. However, our system makes
the identity provision procedure more automatic and provides the identity
of currently logged in user. In this case, idpID is provided only to avoid
revealing userID before the SS is authenticated, as specified in Section 5.5.
SAML Just like SAML, our system enables federated IdM, i.e. requires
that parties providing and using identity data initially establish relationships.
However, SAML defines several profiles that include HTTP POST messages,
thus it is designed to enable SSO to web-services by using web browsers,
whereas our system does not impose any limitations on service or client
software.
OAuth2 Similarly to OAuth2, our system uses an authorisation mecha-
nism for resource access control. However, OAuth2 defines a wide scope of
available resources and operations for their manipulation, whereas in our
system, resources are identity data and services. Furthermore, in our sys-
tem, authorisation decisions are made by two parties, i.e. IdP and service.
Just like SAML, OAuth2 is similar to our system because of a requirement
to establish relationships among parties before they actually communicate.
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Furthermore, OAuth2 omits using HTTP POST messages. Thus, just like
our system it enables a wide scope of services and clients.
OpenID Connect From the systems defined in Chapter 3, our system
is mostly similar to OpenID Connect, because both of them enable user
authentication and provide identity management layer for access to identity
data as a resource. Since OpenID Connect is built on OAuth2, it shares most
of its features and thus similarities with our system, as mentioned above.
6.2 Satisfaction of 7 Laws of Identity
Cameron [11] defined a set of laws for IdM that are necessary for preserving
user’s privacy when using identities to access web-based services. We evaluate
our system based on these laws, as presented further:
1. User Control and Consent requires that a user has control over
his/her identity data in IdM system and authorises the system to reveal
user’s information to other parties by explicit consent. This require-
ment is rather straightforward and simply defines that a user should
know when and what data is sent to a party. Our system addresses this
aspect by informing the user about acceptable identities before login,
and the specific set of identity data during login, based on relationships
between IdP and SP.
2. Minimal Disclosure for Constrained Use specifies that only the
minimal set of information that enables certain functionality, e.g. a
service, should be disclosed. Our system does not directly address this
aspect. However, since a SP has to establish a trust relationship with
an IdP before it can obtain identity data, these relationships may be
used to define what data subsets are needed for certain operations.
Furthermore, upon login and/or request to data associated with a user
or device, IdP may inform the user about service’s requirements for
data.
3. Justifiable Parties defines that identity information should be dis-
closed only to parties that serve a certain purpose in the system, defined
with relationships. Our system addresses this requirement by perform-
ing user, device and service authentication. In this case, identity data
and userID itself, if the initial connection message sent by DS to SS
includes only idpID, is revealed to the service only after it is authen-
ticated.
CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION 84
4. Directed Identity principle states that a universal IdM system should
support both omni-directional and unidirectional identifiers represent-
ing an entity for other public and private entities, respectively. Our
system fails to meet this requirement, since it treats all entities the
same, and uses one type of identifier, i.e. udevID to access services.
However, since already mentioned, initial provision of idpID rather
than udevID may be treated as provision of a public identifier, until
the service is authenticated and thus trusted with the private udevID.
Furthermore, the proposed system enables having multiple different
identities and controls access to these identifiers and identity data.
Thus, it effectively provides the same privacy features as demanded by
this law.
5. Pluralism of Operators and Technologies requires a system to
enable collaboration of multiple IdM technologies delivered by differ-
ent IdPs. Our system fails to meet this requirement, because it does
not address collaboration of different IdPs, although this functionality
may be introduced in future work. However, from a user’s perspective,
he/she may use several IdPs, potentially based on different communi-
cation technologies. On the other hand, in order to ensure a uniform
functionality of several IdPs, specifying the protocol for interaction is
insufficient. It is also necessary to define identity fields, e.g. name, ad-
dress, account number, device communication frequency, etc. Lack of
such definitions would complicate IdP and service implementation, as
well as establishment of relationships among them. The current work
does not address these issues. However, they may be easily addressed
by introducing an identity data specification layer with field types and
formats for use by all IdPs, SSs and DSs.
6. Human Integration defines that an IdM system should enable such
attack-proof means for human-machine interaction that a human user
would become a part of the IdM mechanism. Effectively, involving a
human user into device-to-device communications is one of the primary
goals for our system. The identification system and authentication
mechanisms presented in this thesis show that our proposed system
meets this requirement.
7. Consistent Experience Across Contexts principle states that a
system should enable separation of contexts based on different opera-
tors and technologies as well as enable consistent user experience across
these contexts. Our system entirely meets this requirement and even
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exceeds it, because besides operators and technologies (we assume com-
munication technologies), it also involves domains, i.e. organisations
issuing the identities, into consideration during definition of contexts.
6.3 Utilisation Characteristics
This section addresses additional IdM features that are considered important
in related literature.
6.3.1 Trust
As identified by Windley [61], storing identity data in IdP server is greatly
related to trust of IdP, which is not limited to merely knowing the exact
organisation that provides IdM service. In addition to that, the users of the
system, including identity managers and the actual subjects described by
identities, need to be ensured that the IdP they utilise will not go out of
business. Such a situation would result in inability of accessing services and
potentially loss of managed data. Furthermore, a user cares if IdP would
block his/her account if the credentials are stolen or it is hacked in some
way.
Our system does not address the issue of an IdP going out of business.
Thus, in order to protect the data and functionality, the system needs addi-
tional means for exporting the managed identities. This would enable easily
moving the identity hierarchy of a domain to another IdP. However, devIDs
installed in devices include domIDs, which depend on idpIDs. Thus, if iden-
tities are moved to another IdP, data installed in devices has to be updated.
This aspect is not addressed in the current system’s proposal and requires
further investigation.
On the other hand, our system enables blocking compromised accounts
by deleting identities and potentially creating new ones, with the same in-
formation, but different identifier. Identity deletion on IdP side is sufficient,
because even if the user’s device provides non-existent credentials, login pro-
cedure is performed on-line and involves a corresponding IdP, thus authen-
tication would fail. However, for usability purposes, e.g. in order to avoid
suggesting that a user chooses non-existent identities, inactive identity data
should be deleted from a device in a certain way. Since modification of data in
a device is protected by administrator password or additional mechanisms,
such a procedure would be rather complex. However, just as installation
of new identities, deletion of old identity data is expected to be performed
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rather infrequently. Thus, such a situation should not introduce significant
discomfort.
6.3.2 Usability
We consider system’s usability from the user’s perspective. In order to in-
crease the chances of the system being widely adopted, it needs to be user-
friendly. In other words, it should not require much effort from users to learn
and afterwards use the system. One of the strategies to reduce the mentioned
effort is to make the system’s operation similar to other IdM systems.
Our system is focused on a user that has several identities and authenti-
cates using certain credentials. This situation is already familiar to Internet
users, since they have multiple different accounts associated with diverse
services. In the most common case, our system demands that a user pro-
vides a user-name (user identifier) and password combination, which is also
common in various web-based systems as well as mobile applications. Fur-
thermore, authorising services to access user information is also a frequent
feature, e.g. seen in third party application authorisation in Facebook. Thus,
when prompted with service requests to access identity data, users should
not be surprised and are expected to understand performed actions and their
implications.
However, new features, such as additional device login, may puzzle users
without initial preparation. Thus, in order to perform new operations, a
proper interactive helper is needed, that would introduce the feature and
assist the user when performing certain steps of these features.
6.3.3 Anonymity
In certain cases, a user may want to stay anonymous, i.e. provide only
general information that would not enable identification. However, just like
other IdM systems discussed in this document, our system is geared towards
provision of data that is pseudo- or completely identifying the user and thus
enable personalised services. Typically, services that enable anonymous con-
nection do not authenticate users or utilise their identity data. Thus, even
if a user is required to provide a pseudonym when he/she accesses a service,
this does not constitute an identity and thus is not considered a problem
related to IdM.
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6.4 Practical Application Issues
6.4.1 Prototype Implementation and Out-of-Scope
Parts
An apparent drawback of this work is lack of a system’s prototype imple-
mentation. Although the system looks promising theoretically, it is essential
to implement its prototype and test it with real users. This also means that
out-of-scope parts of the systems must be filled with specific design solutions.
For many of these parts, we provide recommended or possible implementa-
tion options, thus creation of a prototype should not be a problem.
However, multiple out-of-scope parts indicate that such an identity man-
agement and communication system greatly depends on other systems and
technologies that provide security, communication mechanisms and software
for functionality. This means that introduction of such a system may require
collaboration with multiple institutions to make adjustments or updates in
the associated technologies. However, it also means that this thesis provides
an idea of an IdM system based on identified requirements, rather a complete
specification. Parts left for decisions during implementation show that this
document does not limit implementation possibilities and leave development
of specifications for this kind of systems to specification institutions.
6.4.2 Legal Identity Management Issues
Identity data identifies a user and reveals user’s personal details that, if
stolen, may result in damage of certain type. Thus, it must be protected. As
noted by Windley [61], IdM systems are often regulated by law that often
requires that IdPs define utilised methods for obtaining and storing the data,
the purpose of collecting data and the peers that will have access to this data.
However, previous technologies consider either public general data stored in
a public IdPs, or private, more sensitive data, e.g. bank account number and
home address, in ad-hoc IdPs controlled by certain institutions for provision
of specific internal services and serve specialised purposes.
However, in this work, we go a step further and propose storing private
identity data in the cloud, i.e. in a public IdM system. Although this data is
managed by trusted parties, it is stored in a remote location. Furthermore,
in order to enable automatic access to this data, it cannot be completely
hidden from the IdP. Thus, our system is facing a potential problem asso-
ciated with trust and legal restrictions that may impede successful spread
of the technology. In order to avoid that, additional security mechanisms
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or contracts by public IdPs may be needed, which this document does not
address.
6.4.3 Secure Data Storage in Users’ Devices
Another concern emerges from current implementations of sensitive data pro-
tection in users’ devices.
Currently, Android OS ”forgets” user’s credentials when the screen of a
device is locked and retrieves them again for easy access when the screen
is unlocked. The unlock mechanism requires that the owner of a device
proves his/her presence by typing in a Personal Identification Number (PIN)
code or drawing a pattern that is used to recompute the secret to unlock
credentials [20]. Although this security aspect ensures data protection, it
limits possibilities of creating a completely automatic system that works with
a locked screen. In order to enable desired functionality of access to sensitive
data without the need to constantly unlock the screen, Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE) technology [30] could be used. However, it still requires
changes and adoption by mobile OSs before it can be used.
In addition to that, mobile OSs treat devices as personal devices, thus
PIN- or pattern-based screen unlock mechanisms assume there is only one
user/owner and thus one correct user-provided secret. There are no possi-
bilities to isolate sets of credentials by creating separate user accounts with
different PIN codes for each user. Thus, our system would require even more
changes in different mobile OSs.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis revealed current issues related to development of future commu-
nication technologies, particularly lack of orientation towards regular users,
and addressed these problems by proposing a sophisticated IdM system that
utilises a complex identification system and enables management of identity
hierarchies in a private or a could IdM server. Furthermore, the system ad-
dresses user-related IdM, which led to a proposal of a SDSO mechanism.
This section discusses potential future work that would allow improving the
system as well as presents the final remarks of the thesis.
7.1 Future Work
7.1.1 Practical Implementation
In order to evaluate the currently proposed system and be able to improve it,
the next step of the remaining work is to implement and test the system in
practice. A prototype implementation based on the proposal presented in this
thesis should be tested by real human users, who could afterwards provide
feedback regarding the effort needed to understand the system’s concept,
create identities and use identifiers to access services.
Furthermore, current proposal involves multiple out-of-scope aspects,
which may require further elaboration and specification. Implementing a
practical prototype would allow trying different options, which would in turn
give more information about the needs of the system and thus enable im-
proving it further.
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7.1.2 Application Programming Interface for Device
Subsystem
One of the aspects not elaborated in this document is interaction between
third party or OS applications and the DS. Therefore, it is important to
define an API specification that would allow developers more quickly learn
the technology and use it in development of applications and services.
7.1.3 Legal Aspects
As indicated in the discussion provided in Chapter 6, IdM procedures are
subject to legal regulations. Our system complicates the situation even more
by introducing universal IdPs that do not fit in the regulations designed for
more limited, ad-hoc IdM systems. Thus, envisaged future work includes
an analysis of existing regulations in different countries and identification of
system’s aspects that contradict existing rules and require modification of
existing or introduction of new legal rules.
7.1.4 Survey of Involved Actors
Users often express their concern regarding privacy when an IdM system or a
service asks them for personal details. Such a reluctance to provide personal
information may prevent our system from reaching an adequate number of
users, enterprises and services that would enable large-scope benefits of the
system. Thus, in future work, it is needed to survey different parties, includ-
ing regular human users, identity managers and service providers, regarding
their expectations about the proposed IdM system and willingness to use it.
The survey should address two different situations: when the IdPS is run
privately and when it is deployed in a cloud.
7.2 Final Remarks
Scientists and the industry unanimously agree that the number of
communication-capable devices used by both industry and regular human
users is only going to increase. This will inevitably result in a multiplicity
of devices and abundance of communicated data, most of which will be re-
dundant and impose requirements for automatic processing. This will not
only require changes in communication techniques and infrastructures, but
also rethinking service models, applications and especially user-performed
work-flow.
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To the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the first work that addresses
automatic user-based device-to-device communications and SDSO feature for
easy connection of multiple user’s devices. With this proposal, we hope to
attract scientific community’s attention towards the unexplored and rather
relevant area of user-related automatic device communications. As a result,
we expect that the proposed solution encourages new user-related commu-
nication system proposals, specific protocols and their implementations, as
well as emergence of applications based on these systems. Such systems
would contribute to evolution of communications and the Internet, thus even
more improving user welfare by enabling advanced automatic and ubiquitous
user-related functionality.
However, it is important to note that the IdM system presented in this
thesis serves a different purpose than other currently developed industry-
related technologies that enable communications in proprietary static infras-
tructures. The latter systems address different problems and enable use cases
that diverge from objectives of our system. Therefore, it is highly possible
that the future of communication technologies will experience coexistence of
both industry- and regular user-oriented technologies and applications, thus
providing specialised solutions serving distinct needs.
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